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INTRODUCTION 
Conflicts between religious freedom and equality law are 
unlikely to disappear anytime soon. Take for example 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, which is currently pending before the 
 
*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to Professors Elaine Chiu and Rosa 
Castello, as well as to Jennifer Flores, Brittaney Overbeck, and the other editors of the 
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development for hosting the symposium on my 
book, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age (2017) and for editing this issue of the 
Journal. This piece replies to the excellent responses I received there. For helpful 
comments on previous drafts, I am grateful to Elizabeth Anker, Michael Dorf, Kent 
Greenawalt, Andrew Koppelman, Genevieve Lakier, David Pozen, Micah Schwartzman, 
and participants at the Cornell Law and Humanities Colloquium and the Columbia Law 
School Public Law Workshop.  
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Supreme Court of the United States.1 After a Christian baker 
refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, Colorado 
found that he had violated the state’s public accommodations 
law, which protects customers against discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. Challenging that determination, the 
baker is arguing that serving the couple would have contravened 
his religious beliefs, and he is claiming protection under the 
speech and religion clauses of the First Amendment. 
Or consider Barber v. Bryant, a challenge to Mississippi’s 
H.B. 1523.2 That law specifies three beliefs—that marriage 
should be confined to different-sex couples, that sex outside 
marriage is wrong, and that gender identity should be fixed at 
birth—and it provides robust protection for those who hold such 
beliefs, even against state civil rights law. A federal district court 
invalidated the law on constitutional grounds.3 A federal First 
Amendment Defense Act, which bears some resemblance to the 
Mississippi law, has been considered by Congress and it has the 
support of President Trump.4  
Or consider the Attorney General’s Memorandum on 
Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty, which sets out 
guidelines for all federal agencies.5 It endorses a broad vision of 
 
1 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017) 
(granting cert.). Notably, the Solicitor General filed a brief in support of the baker, even 
though no federal statute is involved. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 
2017 WL 4004530 (filed Sept. 7, 2017). 
2 2016 Miss. Laws H.B. 1523. 
3 Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677 (2016). That decision was reversed for lack of 
standing. Barber v. Bryant, 872 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 2018 WL 
311355 (2018). I signed an amicus brief in support of the appellees. Brief of Church-State 
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance, 2016 WL 
7438560 (5th Cir. filed Dec. 22, 2016). 
4 First Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Congress (2015–2016), § 3(a); Mary 
Emily O’Hara, First Amendment Defense Act Looms Over Sessions’ Confirmation Vote, 
NBC NEWS, Jan. 30, 2017, http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/first-amendment-
defense-act-looms-over-sessions-confirmation-vote-n714226. See also H.R. Comm. On 
Oversight And Gov’t Reform: Hearing on H.R. 2802, the First Amendment Defense Act 
(FADA), 114th Cong. 6 (July 12, 2016) (testimony of Professor Katherine Franke), 
https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2016-07-12-Franke-Columbia-
Law-Testimony.pdf. 
5 Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty, 82 Fed. Reg. 49668 (Oct. 26, 2017); 
see also Naomi Goldenberg, An Appraisal of Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age by 
Nelson Tebbe: Eight Commentaries and Tebbe’s Response, __ J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. __, at 
*4–*5 (forthcoming, 2018) (analyzing use of the category of religion in the Attorney 
General’s memorandum). 
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religious freedom, including in situations where it conflicts with 
equality law. For example, the memorandum broadens a key 
exemption from employment discrimination law.6 And it 
maintains that religious exemptions may be extended even in 
situations where they entail harm to others.7 (Such third-party 
harms often accompany religious exemptions from civil rights 
laws.8) 
Although many more examples could be given, think 
finally of the Trump Administration’s decision to expand 
religious and moral exemptions from the “contraception 
mandate.” Promulgated by the Obama Administration under 
authority of the Affordable Care Act, the contraception mandate 
protects women by requiring employers who provide health 
insurance to include coverage for women’s contraception. In two 
regulations, the Trump Administration now has allowed 
employers with religious or moral objections to opt out of the 
contraception requirement.9 A federal court has enjoined both 
rules, finding that they violate the Administrative Procedure Act 
and that they are not required by the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.10  
 
6 82 Fed. Reg. at 46970. This provision is similar to the Russell Amendment, which 
had been proposed in Congress but never enacted. Current law allows religious 
organizations to hire only members of the same faith, despite the general prohibition on 
religious discrimination. Section 702 of Title VII, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. Going 
further, the Russell Amendment would have allowed these groups to terminate workers 
for refusing to follow tenets of the faith. Amendment to H.R. 4909 Offered by Mr. Russell 
of Oklahoma (Apr. 27, 2016), 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20160427/104832/BILLS-114-HR4909-R000604-
Amdt-232r2.pdf. So a worker could be terminated for becoming pregnant out of wedlock, 
even if she remained a member of the church. And that worker could be fired even when 
that would otherwise amount to discrimination on the basis of a protected ground, such as 
sex or even pregnancy itself. The Russell Amendment draws its language from the 
Americans With Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)(2) (“a religious organization may 
require that all applicants and employees conform to the religious tenets of such 
organization”). See Douglas Laycock, Defense Authorization Bill Needs To Protect 
Religious Liberty, THE HILL, Nov. 17, 2016, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/labor/306539-defense-authorization-bill-needs-to-protect-religious-liberty. 
7 Id.  
8 See Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience 
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2534 (2015) (exploring the connection 
between complicity claims and third-party harms). 
9 82 Fed. Reg. 47792 (Oct. 6, 2017); 82 Fed. Reg. 47838 (Oct. 6, 2017).  
10 Pennsylvania v. Trump, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2017 WL 6398465, at *17–*18 (E.D. Pa. 
2017). 
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In Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age, I offered a 
way to understand and resolve such conflicts between religious 
freedom and equality law.11 After proposing a method called 
social coherence, I deployed it to develop four principles that can 
guide constitutional decision-making on such questions. I then 
used that method and those principles to suggest solutions in 
specific areas of legal controversy. My arguments have now 
drawn six thoughtful responses, published together in the 
current issue of the Journal of Civil Rights & Economic 
Development.12 
In this Reply, I explore some larger questions that have 
been prompted by the book but that fell outside its focus on the 
interaction between religious freedom and civil rights law. 
Spurred by the responses, but also independent of them, I 
examine the implications of my arguments for an egalitarian 
theory of the First Amendment. Though it is of course impossible 
to fully develop such a vision in this Reply, there is room to begin 
that work. Along the way, I answer some of the more pointed 
questions posed in these six responses.  
In Part I below, I begin by considering challenges to the 
enterprise of religious freedom jurisprudence from critical 
theorists. Here, I am most interested in arguments from 
academic scholars of religion.13 In influential work, these writers 
argue that the category of religion is too unstable and 
 
11 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017). 
12 Carlos A. Ball, Against LGBT Exceptionalism in Religious Exemptions from 
Antidiscrimination Obligations, 31 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 233 (2018); Alan Brownstein, 
Attempting to Engage in Socially Coherent Dialogue about Religious Liberty and Equality, 
31 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 71 (2018); Chad Flanders, In (Partial) Praise of (Some) 
Compromise: Comments on Tebbe, 31 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 201 (2018); Andrew 
Koppelman, Tebbe and Reflective Equilibrium, 31 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 125 (2018); 
Patricia Marino, What Is the “Social” in “Social Coherence?” Commentary on Nelson 
Tebbe’s Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age, 31 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 115 (2018); 
Laura Underkuffler, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age: Rejecting Doctrinal 
Nihilism in the Adjudication of Religious Claims, 31 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 217 (2018). 
13 Several responses to the book from critical theorists of religion have been collected 
in a forthcoming roundtable in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion. 
Contributions from critical theorists include Christoph Baumgartner, But There Is No 
Conceptual Level Playing Field! Challenges to Nelson Tebbe’s Social Cohesion Approach to 
Religious Diversity, __ J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. __ (forthcoming, 2018); Janet Jakobsen, 
Equality of Religious Freedom,__ J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. __ (forthcoming, 2018); and Roberto 
Blancarte, Let’s Be Reasonable!, __ J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. __ (forthcoming, 2018). My reply 
is Reasons and Religion, __ J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. __ (forthcoming, 2018).  
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ideologically inflected for use in legal administration.14 They also 
contend that emphasizing religious freedom distorts our 
understanding of cultural conflicts and deepens divisions among 
social groups.15 Underlying both of these arguments is skepticism 
about the project of secular constitutionalism generally—doubt 
about its reliance on unstable distinctions between secular and 
religious, public and private, group and individual. 
Critical work on religion deserves to be taken seriously, 
not least because some of its critiques are convincing. For 
example, academic scholars of religion are right to highlight the 
contestability of the category of religion. That term has no 
universal referent, and it has been deployed in ways that benefit 
powerful interests and ideologies. That the category of religion is 
contingent does not mean that it cannot be used by particular 
actors in particular institutional settings, however. It can be 
defined differently in different doctrinal contexts and for 
different purposes. I argue that the term religion should be 
specified according to the variegated values that drive particular 
doctrines. So “religion” may mean one thing for 
nondiscrimination law under the First Amendment and it might 
mean another thing for religious exemptions.16 Proceeding this 
way brings together critical and constructive approaches to 
religious freedom. 
An implication is that the category of religion can, and 
often should, include beliefs and practices that are considered 
nonreligious in colloquial discourse. That raises the related 
question of whether religion ought to be treated with special 
solicitude in constitutional law. I address that question in Part 
II, where I argue explicitly that there are no good reasons to 
exclude certain convictions of conscience from most areas of 
religious freedom doctrine. Categorically excluding nonreligious 
commitments from free exercise and nonestablishment risks 
serious unfairness, while including them selectively can further 
the rationales for enacting and enforcing those provisions in the 
first place. 
 
14 For citations, see infra Part I.A. 
15 For citations, see infra Part I.B. 
16 For an earlier version of this argument, Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 
1111, 1130–40 (2011). 
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A significant development here comes from Andrew 
Koppelman, who is a leading defender of the view that religion is 
special in constitutional law. He has now clarified that courts can 
and should protect convictions of conscience alongside familiar 
religion.17 Koppelman resists those that would supplant the 
category of religion in American law, not those who would 
supplement it with analogous categories.18 So in one important 
sense, Koppelman has acknowledged that religion is not special. I 
endorse this move, and I give reasons for retaining the category 
of religion even though its place in the First Amendment is not 
unique. 
Part III concerns a question that follows naturally: In a 
world where religion is not special, how should we conceptualize 
First Amendment law? Unlike some other egalitarians, I do not 
propose to eliminate religious exemptions from general laws. 
Religious actors can and should be relieved from government 
regulations where doing so would not inordinately harm the 
public interest. Nor do I argue that the Establishment Clause 
should cease to be enforced—far from it. But my commitments to 
strong enforcement of free exercise and nonestablishment seem 
to sit uneasily with a conviction that religion is not special.  
Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age did not take up 
this general puzzle, focusing instead on the particular conflict 
between religious freedom and civil rights law. And although it 
described a method for thinking through such disputes, it 
specifically avoided articulating a substantive theory of religious 
freedom. But in this symposium, critics are inviting me to explore 
the implications of the book’s arguments for a general theory. 
Again, I cannot defend such a theory in this Reply but I can 
describe why the puzzle is solvable in principle. 
Accordingly, I suggest in Part III that religious freedom 
law is consistent with a framework of full and equal membership 
in the polity. Full membership means that government cannot 
unreasonably thwart the exercise of basic capacities. It includes 
the right to believe and practice according to the dictates of 
 
17 In addition to his contribution to this symposium, see Andrew M. Koppelman, 
“Religion” as a Bundle of Legal Proxies: Reply to Micah Schwartzman, 51 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1079 (2014). 
18 I also respond to pragmatic arguments by Alan Brownstein. 
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religion, conscience, and comparable commitments. Equal 
membership guarantees that government will avoid constituting 
classes of people as subordinate. For example, officials cannot 
endorse a particular religion because that would relegate 
nonadherents to an inferior legal status. Together, these 
imperatives provide a framework that has the potential to make 
sense of the religion clauses in the context of secular 
constitutionalism. They organize the values that inform specific 
legal rules. 
Part III also responds to a complaint that the book is too 
conservative in one respect—in its argument for a robust freedom 
of association. As I explain, this critique misapprehends both the 
scope of the associational interest and the stipulation that it can 
be overbalanced by government imperatives. 
Understanding the religion clauses as guaranteeing free 
and equal membership has implications for a challenge to civil 
rights law that is prominent at the moment, namely the 
argument from symmetry. On this view, religious traditionalists 
themselves are at risk of being relegated to a disfavored 
citizenship status, not by private discrimination, but instead by a 
liberal orthodoxy in government policymaking and its refusal to 
grant sufficient religious exemptions. In Part IV, I address this 
argument. Whether it is correct depends on law’s expressive 
impact, and on social meanings. Certainly, it is possible to 
imagine scenarios where religious traditionalists could suffer 
citizenship degradation as a consequence of civil rights laws. But 
neither the logic of antidiscrimination laws nor the actual cases 
that have arisen so far suggest that such a risk is imminent or 
equivalent to the structural injustice experienced by other 
groups. 
In Part V, I correct several misimpressions about the 
method of social coherence. Two insightful commentators, Chad 
Flanders and Patricia Marino, think that the method is designed 
to generate some sort of legal consensus or agreement. Once that 
interpretation is corrected, their concerns about the method 
should ease. Social coherence is designed not to generate 
consensus or even lower tensions, but merely to preserve the 
possibility of reason giving. 
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In a short conclusion, I urge critical theorists and left 
egalitarians to come together behind something like my vision of 
conscience and equality. Lawyers and theorists can and should 
argue for full and equal membership without conceding that the 
category of religion should dominate the discussion, and without 
becoming complacent about the political dynamics that inevitably 
influence First Amendment law.  
I. Critical Theories  
Today, religious freedom jurisprudence is drawing 
skepticism from (at least) two directions. Academic scholars of 
religion, writing mostly from the political left, question the 
integrity of the category itself, as well as the uses to which it has 
been put by governments and other powerful actors.19 And some 
legal scholars, writing mostly from the political right, question 
whether religion-clause law can be rationalized, or whether legal 
decisions in this area are necessarily patternless, arbitrary, or 
irrational.20 Together, these critiques pose fundamental 
challenges not just to First Amendment law, but to the project of 
liberal constitutionalism. Part of my aim here is to show that 
they deserve to be taken seriously. 
Having addressed legal scholars in the book,21 I focus here 
on critical scholars of religion. My conclusion is that they are 
mostly right to say that existing religious freedom law is 
unstable and unprincipled, but that their critique can be turned 
to constructive ends. If we recognize that the category of 
religion—and the idea of religious freedom—can and should be 
specified according to the values that properly drive First 
Amendment analysis in particular contexts, then we can allow 
those values to dictate the scope and strength of protection in 
each area. That way, we can push constitutional law beyond the 
category of religion itself, as it has conventionally been conceived. 
The success of that project then depends on the persuasiveness of 
its arguments, which are explored throughout the rest of this 
Reply. 
 
19 See notes infra Part I.A, and I.B. 
20 See infra note 52. 
21 TEBBE, supra note 11, at 25–48. 
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 A. First Wave Critiques 
It is helpful to organize critical theories of religion into 
two waves. In the first wave, scholars interrogated the category 
of religion itself. Of course, efforts to define the term had long 
occupied the field of religious studies. Some scholars had tried to 
organize the concept substantively, by isolating characteristics 
that all religions shared.22 Others had developed functional 
approaches that highlighted the role of beliefs and practices in 
the construction and reproduction of social groups.23  
Departing from both of these approaches, critical scholars 
questioned whether the category of religion could be defined at 
all, or without serious costs. Talal Asad, in seminal work, argued 
that the category has no universal referent.24 No single attribute, 
and no cluster of attributes, can distinguish all religions from 
nonreligion. Even the notion of divinity or superhuman power is 
absent from, say, Theravada Buddhism, which is commonly 
considered an important strain of a major world religion.  
Asad explained this instability by pointing to the history 
of the concept, which was curiously infrequent in early Western 
thought.25 Dividing peoples into faith traditions was a 
 
22 The dominant substantive approach defines religion as a cultural complex of beliefs 
and practices that relate to the superhuman or supernatural. See MARTIN RIESEBRODT, 
THE PROMISE OF SALVATION: A THEORY OF RELIGION 74–75 (2010) (discussing and citing 
MELFORD E. SPIRO, RELIGION: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION, IN 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF RELIGION 96 (Michael Banton ed., 
1966)); see also Jonathan Z. Smith, Religion, Religions, Religious, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR 
RELIGIOUS STUDIES 269, 281 (Mark C. Taylor, ed., 1998) (“The anthropological definition 
of religion that has gained widespread assent among scholars of religion . . . is that 
formulated by Melford E. Spiro, ‘an institution consisting of culturally patterned 
interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings.’”). Bruce Lincoln proposes a 
similar definition that nevertheless is “polythetic and flexible.” BRUCE LINCOLN, HOLY 
TERRORS: THINKING ABOUT RELIGION AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 5 (2003). 
23 Durkheim argued that religious beliefs work to bind people together into social or 
cultural groups. ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE: A 
STUDY IN RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY 41 (1915). He described religion as “a unified system of 
beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and 
forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community . . . all 
those who adhere to them.” Id. at 44. Geertz extended the functional understanding of 
religion, emphasizing the role of language in group formation. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 90 (1973). 
24 TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN 
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM (1993). 
25 Religion or “religio” was first used in Europe to describe forms of Christian 
monasticism. Smith, supra note 22, at 269–270. 
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surprisingly late development, in other words. When the term 
religion did become more prominent, it often functioned to 
describe the beliefs and practices of others, particularly colonized 
subjects. And today, the diversity of definitions among scholars of 
religion supports the contention that the term has no fixed 
referent.26 
Asad made two further arguments that have been 
particularly influential. First, he pointed out that the leading 
definitions tended to emphasize individuality, inwardness, and 
privacy.27 That tendency led to misapprehension of traditions 
that emphasized physical practices or community identification 
rather than moral or theological conviction. Second and related, 
he explained that the conventional understanding of religion had 
roots in European Protestantism that distorted its application to 
nonwestern cultures.28 That was especially concerning where 
deployment of the term had political ramifications.29 
Building on Asad’s work, scholars interested in legal 
discourses and institutions began to argue that the category of 
religion was too indeterminate and ideological to be used in 
jurisprudence. For example, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan 
conducted careful empirical studies of religious freedom 
litigation, focusing on the difficulty that courts were having 
deciding whether actual practices qualified for protection under 
free exercise doctrine. One of her conclusions was that the 
category of religion, and therefore the doctrine of religious 
freedom, could not be deployed by courts without unacceptable 
distortion.30 
 B. Second-Wave Critiques 
In the second wave of critical work, religion scholars have 
highlighted the actual use of religious freedom in political and 
 
26 Cécile Laborde calls this the “semantic” critique of religious freedom. CÉCILE 
LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION 18 (2017). 
27 ASAD, supra note 24, at 45–57; see also RIESEBRODT, supra note 22, at 8; ELIZABETH 
SHAKMAN HURD, BEYOND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 55–58 (2015) (on Asad). 
28 “My argument,” he wrote, “is that there cannot be a universal definition of 
religion. . . .” ASAD, supra note 24, at 29. 
29 Laborde calls this the “Protestant” critique. LABORDE, supra note 26, at 21. 
30 WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 8, 10, 
150–51 (2005). 
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legal discourses. They have diagnosed the distortions and 
divisions that result when the secular state uses religious 
freedom as the dominant template for understanding diverse 
instances of injustice.  
For example, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd identifies the 
costs of privileging religious freedom as the sole or primary 
concern of international efforts to help suffering peoples.31 
Looking for violations of religious freedom, as international 
programs often do, not only risks overlooking other forms of 
government wrongdoing, but it also can incentivize groups to 
identify as religious. According to Hurd, that incentive ossifies 
group differences that once were fluid and it prompts people to 
understand their own traditions in terms of individual belief 
rather than ritual practices or communal identifications.  
Similarly, Saba Mahmood warns against the distorting 
effects of religious liberty discourse on debates over the political 
plight of Coptic Christians in Egypt.32 Inspired by Asad, she 
argues that regulation of religion by the secular state not only 
has disempowered such groups but also has transformed them. 
As religion has become increasingly important to their identity, it 
has contributed to division and inequality. Promoted by the U.S. 
government and private patrons in the American evangelical 
movement, the concept of religious freedom has worked to worsen 
the “precarious position of religious minorities in the polity.”33 
Emphasis on religious freedom and human rights, therefore, 
risks unintended consequences in actual political practice.34 
Importantly, the critique of these authors is not limited to 
religious freedom and human rights, but it extends to the project 
of the “secular” state itself. In their view, secularism and 
neutrality, as government ideals, are intertwined with the 
concept of free exercise. These political ideas work together to 
distort social phenomena, to deepen political divisions along 
 
31 HURD, supra note 27, at 63. 
32 SABA MAHMOOD, RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE IN A SECULAR AGE, 15 (2016); see also 
Camille Robcis, Decolonizing Secularism, SYNDICATE, July 11, 2016, 
https://syndicate.network/symposia/theology/religious-difference-in-a-secular-age/. 
33 MAHMOOD, supra note 32, at 15–17. 
34 Laborde calls this the “realist” critique—her third and final type of critical 
argument against religious freedom. LABORDE, supra note 26, at 13. 
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religious lines, and to disempower groups that are now 
constituted as religious minorities.35 
Much of this work—both first-wave and second-wave—is 
powerful and persuasive. Religious freedom law is infamously 
unstable, and one source of its instability is the difficulty of 
drawing lines around the category of religion.36 For example, it is 
difficult to explain why atheists and agnostics are considered by 
courts to be “religious,” and it is even more difficult to explain 
why they are protected in some cases but not others.37 Moreover, 
doctrines on free exercise and nonestablishment have been 
articulated and applied in ways that regularly—some would say, 
systematically—disfavor religious minorities whose traditions do 
not center on individual belief or conscience.38 Some might 
conclude that constitutional doctrine in this area cannot be 
rationalized. 
Yet critical theorists of religious freedom can be 
understood in another way—and understanding them that way 
opens up new pathways for thinking about legal protection and 
political principles. On this alternative view, their key insight is 
not that it is impossible to define the term religion, but that it is 
impossible to define it universally.39 According to J.Z. Smith, for 
example, the lesson that we should draw from observing that 
scholars have proposed many different definitions is not that the 
term religion cannot be defined, but that it can be defined in 
 
35 See, e.g., MAHMOOD, supra note 32, at 3 (“This book is primarily concerned with 
political secularism, particularly the modern state’s production and regulation of religious 
differences in one region of the Middle east . . . .”). 
36 Legal scholars have had their own debate about the definition of religion—a debate 
that has been almost entirely isolated from work in the academic study of religion. For a 
review, see Tebbe, supra note 16, at 1130-1140. That said, courts do not frequently have 
trouble discerning whether a particular practice counts as religious. 
37 See generally id. (investigating when nonbelievers should fall under the purview of 
the religion clauses). 
38 See, e.g., FRANK RAVITCH, FREEDOM’S EDGE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, SEXUAL 
FREEDOM, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 114 (“religious minorities (especially non-
Christian religious minorities) did not reap great benefits from Sherbert [v. Verner]”).  
39 ASAD, supra note 24, at 29 (“[m]y argument . . . is that there cannot be a universal 
definition of religion”); HURD, supra note 27, at 19 (“Neither religions nor religious actors 
are singular, agentive forces that can be analyzed, quantified, engaged, celebrated, or 
condemned—and divided between good and bad. To rely for policy purposes on the 
category of religious actor is, rather, to presume a certain form of actorship motivated by 
religion that is neither intellectually coherent nor sociologically defensible. It is something 
that is claimed about a particular group by a particular authority in a specific context.”). 
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many different ways.40 Religion is a second-order concept that is 
amenable to being specified for diverse purposes in diverse 
institutional settings.  
Viewed this way, critical work suggests that we should 
understand the term religion in the First Amendment in a way 
that is substantive and disaggregated. While there may be no 
definition of religion that applies in all legal settings, the effort to 
protect religious freedom need not be abandoned altogether.41 
Rather, it is possible to circumscribe the right according to the 
purposes of the particular legal doctrine being applied in a 
particular context.  
This approach is substantive, rather than formal, because 
it determines who falls within the domain of a legal rule 
according to the values driving that rule.42 In other words, what 
counts as “religion” depends on the purposes of doctrine 
concerning free exercise, or nonestablishment, or equal 
protection. This is similar to Cécile Laborde’s “interpretive” 
approach to the concept of religion—”what matters,” she says, “is 
that the law, or the theory, expresses and protects the correct 
underlying values.”43 
And my approach is disaggregated, rather than unitary or 
monistic, because it recognizes that plural values may drive First 
Amendment law. For example, the rule against denominational 
discrimination pursues a commitment to government 
evenhandedness among sects,44 while the ministerial exception 
seeks to prevent government interference in the relationship 
between clergy and congregation, among other commitments.45 I 
have defended this variegated view of First Amendment law in 
 
40 Smith, supra note 22, at 269, 281. 
41 Critical legal scholars can sometimes be read to suggest this. 
42 Tebbe, supra note 16, at 1131–1136. 
43 LABORDE, supra note 26, at 20. 
44 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, 246 (1982) (“The clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred 
over another.”). For more on the rule against government preferentialism among sects or 
denominations, see Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1319–22 
(2008). 
45 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 
171, 188 (2012) (recognizing the ministerial exception). For an articulation of the concern 
with government interference in the relationship between clergy and congregation, see 
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2006). For other values 
informing the ministerial exception, see Tebbe, supra note 16, at 1167–69. 
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other writings.46 What it means here is that what counts as “free 
exercise” or “nonestablishment” will differ according to the 
differing substantive commitments undergirding the 
jurisprudence.  
Part of the reason this insight helps to address critiques of 
religious freedom is that, as it turns out, few of the convictions 
that drive the legal doctrine are specific to religion. As I will 
explain below, there is little reason to differentiate religion from 
nonreligion for purposes of constitutional law. That argument, 
together with other normative advances, rectifies many of the 
distortions and divisions identified by these theorists. 
But will this approach satisfy critical scholars of religion? 
Won’t they object that any substantive values that may be 
identified as important to the jurisprudence—equal citizenship, 
individual autonomy, etc.—themselves carry dangers of 
inaccuracy and ideological distortion like the ones that plagued 
religious freedom? More abstractly, will they object that the 
dynamics they identify are intrinsic to secular government, and 
cannot be expunged from within the framework of liberal 
constitutionalism? 
That is possible. Yet two responses convince me that the 
critical and constructive projects can reinforce each other, 
nevertheless. First, critical theorists themselves do not 
categorically reject the possibility of normative argument. In fact, 
as Laborde points out, their analysis is often performed in the 
service of normative aspirations that remain unelaborated if not 
unarticulated.47 So Winnifred Sullivan worries that the unfair 
treatment of nonreligious objectors implicates “the principle of 
equality” and presents “a question of justice.”48 And Peter 
Danchin discusses the decision of a Jewish school to use religious 
 
46 Tebbe, supra note 16, at 1127–30. Here too, my approach resembles Laborde’s 
“disaggregated” method of determining the scope and strength of legal protection for 
religion and conscience. LABORDE, supra note 26, at 2–3. See also Ce cile Laborde, Religion 
in the Law: The Disaggregation Approach, 34 L. & PHIL. 581, 593–94 (2015). 
47 LABORDE, supra note 26, at 18. See also Tebbe, supra note 13, at 5 (noting that 
Baumgartner makes normative arguments that are intelligible in constitutional law and 
political theory). 
48 SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at 150. 
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criteria in admissions as “a matter of justice.”49 The most 
charitable, and I think the most accurate, reading of these 
remarks is not that normative argument is being smuggled in, 
but rather that it falls outside the focus of these scholars’ work. 
And that is perfectly appropriate; diagnostic argument can be 
valuable in itself. 
Mahmood is perhaps most explicit about this. She refers 
repeatedly to ideals such as “universal equality and citizenship”50 
and “the undelivered promise of formal political equality.”51 And 
she says plainly that she is not denouncing secular government 
wholesale.52 Rather, her project is to “deprive[] [secular 
government] of innocence and neutrality so as to craft, perhaps, a 
different future.”53 This is a normative aspiration, and she 
understands that. Of course, Mahmood appreciates the 
limitations of liberal argument—but she also allows for the 
possibility of reform, even if pursuing it is not part of her own 
project. Laborde is right that “critical theorists [that] denounce 
normativity as a system of ideological domination . . . miss out on 
the critical potential of normative philosophy.”54 But Mahmood 
does not make that mistake. Instead, she allows for the two 
projects to coexist and even to benefit from each other. 
My second response to the deep critique of secular 
government is to say that whether it can be rehabilitated 
depends on the success of substantive proposals. For instance, 
whether the scope of free exercise protection can vary according 
to its underlying commitments depends on how well that 
approach works in practice. And whether the scope of 
nonestablishment law can track values such as full and equal 
membership for all persons will depend on the persuasiveness of 
particular projects. Laborde is right about this, too.55 Normative 
 
49 LABORDE, supra note 26, at 18 n.13 (quoting Peter Danchin, Religious Freedom as a 
Technology of Modern Secular Governance, in INSTITUTIONALIZING RIGHTS AND RELIGION: 
COMPETING SUPREMACIES 184, 204 (Leora Batnitzky & Hanoch Dagan eds., 2017)). 
50 MAHMOOD, supra note 32, at 19. 
51 Id. at 20. 
52 Id. at 21. 
53 Id. 
54 LABORDE, supra note 26, at 18. 
55 Id. at 14–15 (noting that some of the arguments of the “critical religion school” can 
be answered only with the kinds of detailed arguments that she offers in the rest of her 
book).  
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theory must prove through its performance that the tensions of 
secular constitutionalism can be successfully managed. 
In the remainder of this Reply, I will explore several 
aspects of that project. One foundational question is how secular 
government can remain evenhanded—not only among religions, 
but also between religion and other forms of profound human 
commitment and identification. Egalitarians have answered that 
religion cannot justifiably enjoy unique status in constitutional 
law. Part II examines how that conviction can be squared with 
existing doctrine, which is built around a constitutional text that 
singles out the free exercise and nonestablishment of “religion.” 
Another foundational question is how a jurisprudence that 
observes equality between religion and other forms of conscience 
and community can protect free exercise and nonestablishment, 
without diluting either guarantee. I address that tension in Part 
III. 
Before turning to those issues, let me briefly address 
another type of skepticism that denies the very possibility of 
rational argument in legal institutions. That sort of theory has 
become influential within the legal academy. 
In the book, I engage with legal scholars who take critical 
approaches to religious freedom from a perspective that is 
sympathetic to religious traditionalism. My focus there is on 
their methodological claim that legal decisions on matters of free 
exercise and nonestablishment are necessarily unreasoned, 
patternless, or ad hoc.56 Against those claims, I argue that legal 
actors can use a coherence approach to reach conclusions backed 
by reasons, even in areas of law that depend on variegated values 
and have long been plagued by contradiction. Comparing new 
 
56 TEBBE, supra note 11, at 25–45. For examples of works with which I engage in my 
book, see, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Decentralizing Religious and Secular Accommodations, 
in INSTITUTIONALIZING RIGHTS AND RELIGION: COMPETING SUPREMACIES 108, 109 (Leora 
F. Batnitzky and Hanoch Dagan eds., 2017) (arguing there is no neutral ground for 
resolving “reasonable and deep disagreement” on questions such as the proper scope of 
religious accommodations from civil rights laws); STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1–13 (2014); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 22 (1999) (addressing legal reasoning more 
generally); Stanley Fish, Symposium: Is Religion Outdated (As a Constitutional 
Category)?: Where’s the Beef?, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1037, 1043 (2014) (“cases involving 
free exercise exemptions and the danger of establishment continue to arise and must be 
dealt with, and there is no satisfactorily rational way of dealing with them”). 
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problems to existing precedents and principles that abstract from 
them, lawyers and judges can find solutions that fit with existing 
commitments. Without treating any of those commitments as 
foundational or fixed, but instead subjecting them to 
reexamination in light of new information or insights, they can 
reach conclusions that cohere with one another and therefore are 
backed by reasons. They can reach conclusions that are justified 
in that sense.57 Because this process is influenced by cultural and 
political dynamics, including the activities of popular movements 
and political mobilizations, I argue that coherence methods in 
constitutional law have a social dimension.58 Although the 
coherence method may seem familiar from common-law 
reasoning, a defense is productive today and perhaps even 
provocative, as Laura Underkuffler notices in her review.59 
In the book, I acknowledge some overlap between the 
skeptics’ way of working on problems of religious freedom and my 
own.60 Here, I want to acknowledge some substantive agreement 
as well. For example, I agree that free exercise and 
nonestablishment doctrines, as currently constituted, are 
unstable and difficult to defend on principled grounds. Moreover, 
the skeptics are right to say that religion-clause law is virtually 
impossible to rationalize using conventional legal categories. So 
the main difference between our positions is really 
methodological: the skeptics believe that giving reasons or 
justifications for religious freedom outcomes is impossible under 
modern conditions, whereas I chart a way forward. 
An implication of my argument in this Part is that the 
concept of religion must often be expanded beyond its 
conventional meaning to accommodate the constitutional or 
statutory commitments that inform a particular doctrine. 
Another way of thinking about this implication, however, is that 
the conventional “religion” category ought not to carry special 
 
57 I distinguish between problems of justification, which I argue can be resolved, and 
problems of epistemology or ontology, which I bracket. 
58 Cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Rule of Law and Socially Constructed Reasons: 
Marriage Equality and Religious Accommodation 
5 J.L. RELIGION & ST. (forthcoming, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2915601. 
59 Underkuffler, supra note 12, at 1. 
60 See, e.g., TEBBE, supra note 11, at 7–8.  
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significance in legal discourse. The next Part pursues that 
suspicion. 
II. Religion’s Specialness 
 Arguments that religion ought not to receive special 
constitutional consideration, nor be saddled with special burdens, 
have become familiar in the legal literature, even if they remain 
unconventional.61 Their key insight, for my purposes here, is that 
whatever the principles driving First Amendment law may be, it 
is difficult to see how they support treating religion differently 
from all nonreligious beliefs and practices.62 If our conception of 
the First Amendment is not formalistic, then its scope should 
track the provision’s underlying rationales. If those rationales 
are not explicitly theological, as they cannot be in a 
constitutional democracy, then they will protect ideologies and 
identifications that extend beyond religion itself.  
For example, consider the rule against government 
discrimination on the basis of faith or sect. Any plausible 
commitment driving that rule must apply beyond the 
conventional understanding of “religion” to include, say, 
nonbelievers and freethinkers who are targeted because of their 
beliefs. In much the same way, other areas of First Amendment 
law ought to protect—or burden—categories of citizens who fall 
outside the commonplace understanding of what it means to be 
religious. 
There is an equality principle at work here: government 
action that treats religious and nonreligious actors differently 
can effect unfairness when those actors are similarly situated 
with respect to the relevant public values. So the argument has a 
place in work on religious freedom and equality law, even though 
it is somewhat orthogonal to the conflict between religion and 
civil rights that forms the subject matter of Religious Freedom in 
an Egalitarian Age.  
 
61 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 126 (2007); BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 4 (2013); Micah 
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1355 (2012).  
62 See Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481, 485 
(2017) (acknowledging the argument that free exercise is under or over-inclusive with 
respect to any of the values that drive the doctrine, but arguing that this is true of all 
constitutional rights). 
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In the book, I simply assumed that critiques of the 
specialness of religion were correct, wholly or in large part, and I 
sought solutions that did not treat religion differently.63 That 
was appropriate, given the focus on religious freedom and 
equality law. But now several of this symposium’s contributors 
are questioning the assumption that religion ought not to draw 
special constitutional concern, and they are asking me to support 
that assumption with arguments.  
 A. In Political Theory 
One of these contributors is Andrew Koppelman, who 
focuses his review on the question of religion’s specialness.64 
Koppleman has distinguished himself as one of the leading 
defenders of religion’s special place in constitutional law.65 
Others have tried to support that view either by simply pointing 
to the text of the Constitution, which uses the term religion,66 or 
by making theological arguments that are unlikely to satisfy 
secular citizens.67 By contrast, Koppleman has articulated a 
sophisticated theory that aims to reconcile religion’s special place 
in the text with commitments of liberal constitutionalism.68 
Koppelman’s argument is that religion provides a 
reasonable proxy for the beliefs and practices that American law 
 
63 See, e.g., TEBBE, supra note 11, at 4–5, 73, 86. 
64 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 1. 
65 See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 123 
(2013). 
66 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171, 189 (2012) (rejecting the government’s view that 
the ministerial exception could be adjudicated under the more general freedom of 
association doctrine, calling that view “remarkable” and “hard to square with the text of 
the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.”); see also Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 S. CT. 
REV. 1, 16 (making the textual argument in a more sophisticated way). 
67 For theological arguments supporting special constitutional solicitude for religion, 
see, e.g., KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW 
(2015); JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 57 (1996); see also Michael J. Perry, 
The Morality of Human Rights: A Nonreligious Ground?, 54 EMORY L.J. 126, 129 (2005) 
(asking whether a nonreligious ground is available for human rights, including freedom of 
religion); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Religious Freedom Irrational?, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
1043, 1053 (2014) (arguing that religious liberty can only sensibly be defended on 
religious grounds). 
68 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 65, at 123 (arguing that religion is an appropriate legal 
proxy for a distinctive set of secular goods); Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized 
Specialness, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 71, 73 (2013). 
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prizes.69 While it may be true that any one of the goods that 
religion generates can also be delivered by nonreligious beliefs 
and practices, the entire set of goods is only associated with 
religion, on his view. Moreover, and I think more important for 
his argument, Koppelman maintains that the category of religion 
is a recognizable social phenomenon and therefore administrable 
by legal actors.70 Workability provides a reason to retain the 
category of religion, rather than trying to pursue the associated 
goods directly.71  
Relatedly, Koppelman argues that it may be impossible to 
directly implement the values that undergird religious freedom 
law because some of them are too vague.72 He analogizes to 
traffic safety—government cannot directly implement the 
conviction that everyone should drive safely, so instead it 
enforces the rule that no one can drive without passing a driving 
test.73 Some imprecision results, but that is unavoidable.74 
Similarly, using religion as a legal category introduces 
inaccuracy with respect to any single constitutional value that 
animates the doctrine, but that is an unavoidable feature of legal 
administration.75 
Against that background, what stands out in Koppelman’s 
review of Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is that he 
offers no reasons why law must protect religion alone, without 
also recognizing profound secular commitments. Putting together 
his review and other recent writings, I have come to the 
conclusion that Koppelman does not in fact believe that religion 
ought to receive special constitutional solicitude, in one specific 
sense. He now acknowledges that no justification for religious 
 
69 Koppelman, supra note 68, at 77–78. 
70 Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1082. 
71 Cf. Flanders, supra note 12, at 8 (“I take it that it is not crazy to think the 
promotion of religious belief itself may be a good. In fact, far from thinking this is not 
crazy, I tend to think that religious is itself a unique human good, and that religious 
organization insofar as they are good at protecting and promoting this good kind of 
deserve an extra kind of associational freedom.”). 
72 Koppelman, supra note 68, at 77–78. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 77. Christopher Lund makes a similar argument, namely that law has to rely 
on categories that are administrable and socially recognizable. Lund, supra note 62, at 
515. 
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freedom law applies solely to religion, and he accepts that 
categories of nonreligious conviction and conduct can and should 
be protected alongside religion.76 He even argues that 
constitutional values should be protected directly, without 
relying on religion or any other proxy, wherever that is 
possible.77 Koppelman’s clarification of these positions counts as 
a major development in the literature. 
His argument might have been difficult to perceive in 
earlier writings because he focused on combatting the extreme 
view that religion ought to be replaced with some other concept 
in constitutional law. Koppelman did specifically consider 
conscience as a candidate for protection, but only as a substitute 
for the category of religion.78 But considering conscience as a 
supplement for religion, rather than a substitute, dissolves 
Koppelman’s objection.79 Lawyers and judges can administer that 
category at least as easily as the term religion, and they are 
sophisticated enough to handle the two concepts instead of just 
one.80  
Actually, constitutional actors can handle more than two 
categories; religion and conscience can appear on a list of 
protected liberties. In fact, modern constitutions and 
international instruments regularly protect freedom of belief and 
practice not only as to religion, but also as to thought, opinion, 
and culture—in short, comparable forms of identification and 
instantiation.81 I will return to the point below, where I will 
 
76 See also Lund, supra note 62, at 504 (“[f]reedom of moral conscience, it turns out, 
serves many of the same values served by freedom of religion”). 
77 Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1082. 
78 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 2 (“American legal theorists have proposed a lot of 
substitutes for ‘religion.’ Conscience is probably the most popular.”). 
79 Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1082 (“I never have said that religion is the only 
legitimate basis for accommodation, nor that conscience, as such, should never be 
accommodated.”); see also Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and 
Religious Exemptions, 15 L. THEORY 215, 240 (2009). 
80 Lund seems more skeptical about whether conscience is a workable legal category 
but he acknowledges that it is a “task worth pursuing.” Lund, supra note 62, at 509–10. 
See also Brownstein, supra note 12, at 30 (“I … am uncertain as to how courts can identify 
what counts as a secular profound commitment that is comparable to religion. I am 
inclined to agree with Andrew Koppelman’s argument in his paper in this symposium and 
elsewhere that there is simply no way to identify, protect and cabin the class of all deeply 
valued human concerns.”). 
81 See, e.g., Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, §15(1) (1996) (“Everyone has 
the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.”); id. at §31 (“1. 
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defend more fully against the objection that protecting other 
beliefs and practices alongside religion is not administrable.82 
A disaggregated approach to the First Amendment can 
work, not only by varying the definition of religion, as I argued in 
the last Part, but also by including other categories of protection 
such as conscience or culture. Under that approach, 
constitutional actors first identify the values informing a 
particular First Amendment doctrine, and then they allow those 
values to determine the scope of protection. In virtually every 
scenario, justifications for free exercise and nonestablishment 
apply beyond religion—that is the central point of the literature 
questioning the specialness of religion.  
Consider again a simple example: if the objective of the 
Free Exercise Clause’s protection against religious 
discrimination is to ban government differentiation that 
constitutes practitioners as subordinate, then that protection 
should extend to atheists and agnostics, even if they do not count 
as religious. Or consider another strain of free exercise law, the 
one that accommodates people who have sincere religious 
objections to general laws, so long as the government has no 
compelling need to apply the law to them. If that doctrine is 
designed to protect individual autonomy around matters of deep 
 
Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the 
right, with other members of that community: a. to enjoy their culture, practise their 
religion and use their language; and b. to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and 
linguistic associations and other organs of civil society” but also providing that the right 
“may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights”); 
id. at §9(3) (“The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth.”); see also id. at §10 (“Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to 
have their dignity respected and protected.”); id. at §16 (“Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression. . . .”); id. at §18 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of 
association.”).  
  For a seminal provision of international human rights law, see G.A. Res. 217 
(XVIII) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. 18 (December 10, 1948) 
(“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance.”); id. at (II) (“Everyone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. . . .”). 
82 See infra Part III.B. 
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commitment and identification, then that rule should also 
accommodate people with profound nonreligious objections. 
Parity is demanded by the underlying values themselves, as well 
as by fairness. Of course, that argument invites numerous 
objections that need to be answered. But the point here is just to 
illustrate that many free exercise values suggest parallel 
protection for nonreligious commitments. Each rationale must be 
considered independently. 
That disaggregated, multivalent approach is perfectly 
compatible with retaining the concept of religion in constitutional 
law. Christopher Lund rightly observes that legal actors use 
socially recognizable categories to protect and pursue basic 
commitments.83 Lawmakers and courts use familiar concepts 
partly for rule-of-law reasons, because administering unfamiliar 
classes would invite arbitrariness and bias. And they use them 
partly to promote intelligibility and administrability. I myself 
hesitate to agree with those who argue that the term religion 
cannot be excised from American law without injustice or 
inaccuracy.84 But regardless, it need not be. Religion is an 
enduring feature of American constitutional law, and it should be 
retained partly for that reason, but that does not mean it should 
enjoy any special status relative to basic First Amendment 
values. 
Some might worry that retaining the category of religion 
in civil rights law—using it at all—will systematically disfavor 
nonbelievers or favor mainstream religious practitioners.85 But 
 
83 Lund, supra note 62, at 515 (“In the context of a written Constitution, the way to 
protect all deep and valuable human commitments is by naming certain specific deep and 
valuable commitments. There is no other way. We start with the ones we know, and we 
keep an open mind about the rest. Religion is not the only deep and valuable human 
commitment. But it is one of them, and that is enough.”). 
84 Lund suggests that religion is a necessary category of American constitutional law; 
he believes that some rights coverage would be lost if courts were to stop using it. See, 
e.g., Lund, supra note 62, at 506 (“disastrous consequences are waiting if judges start 
thinking about religion strictly in terms of [conscience understood as] moral duty”) 
(emphasis added); id. at 511 (“Protections for moral conscience will in no way remove the 
needs for protections of religion or the reasons why we have those protections.”). Cf. 
Nelson Tebbe, The End of Religious Freedom: What Is At Stake?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 963 
(2014) (solicited response to Steven D. Smith, The Last Chapter?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 903 
(2014)). 
85 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at 8 (“Forsaking religious freedom as a legally 
enforced right might entail greater equality among personas and greater clarity and self-
determination for religious individuals and communities. Such a change would end 
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the solution to that problem is to police the unfairness by 
protecting nonreligious beliefs and practices alongside religious 
ones, where demanded by constitutional commitments, and by 
disallowing bias against religious minorities that itself offends 
basic principles. When constitutional protection is keyed to 
values that do not single out religion, continuing to protect 
religion as such does not pose a danger of unfairness, because no 
legal consequences turn on whether a belief or practice is framed 
as religious.86  
Koppelman is right that some critics of the specialness of 
religion wish to supplant that category altogether.87 But that is 
not the only way to argue that religion is not special. It is also 
conceptually coherent to contend that, for any given area of First 
Amendment law, other human endeavors will be protected or 
burdened alongside religion.88 
Again, this is the way that religious freedom is framed in 
most international human rights instruments, and in many 
newer constitutions, as Micah Schwartzman has pointed out.89 
So the South African constitution, which resembles international 
law in this respect, provides that “[e]veryone has the freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought, belief, and opinion.”90 It also 
protects culture, speech, association, and dignity. Those 
formulations seem sensible. I suspect that if Koppelman were 
 
discrimination against those who do not self-identify as religious or whose religion is 
disfavored.”). 
86 Laborde is sometimes ambiguous about whether she would retain the category of 
religion, probably because she is not focused on questions of legal administration. See 
LABORDE, supra note 26, at 32 (“[B]ecause freedom of religion protects a generic capacity, 
it can be adequately expressed through basic liberal freedoms such as freedom of thought, 
speech, and association: it need not be thought of as a distinctive interpretive category. 
Whatever rights religious citizens have, they have in virtue of a feature that is not 
exclusive to religion.”). 
87 This is one way to read Brian Leiter. See LEITER, supra note 61, at 27–28. 
88 At one point, Koppelman argues that critics of religion’s special status in 
constitutional law are often nonbelievers. Koppelman, supra note 68, at 79 (“Their central 
concern—an entirely legitimate concern, given the vicious prejudices they face—has 
rather become protecting themselves from discrimination.”). Many of the leading critics 
are not themselves nonbelievers, but even if they were that fact would be irrelevant to the 
substance of their arguments. Moreover, the critique of religion’s special status has taken 
on an importance in the literature that cannot be explained by the personal motivations of 
any individual theorists. 
89 Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085, 1099–
1100 (2014). 
90 See supra note 81. 
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crafting a new constitutional today, he likely would include some 
such list. My conclusion is that even the leading defenders of 
religion’s specialness are moving away from the argument that 
comparable categories should not be protected alongside 
religion.91  
 B. In Law 
 When it comes to legal authority and judicial 
administration, it becomes harder to say that religion ought not 
to receive special constitutional consideration. This is the 
gravamen of Koppelman’s response to me, and of Brownstein’s. 
Both argue that whatever the requirements of political morality, 
religion does in fact occupy a unique place in existing 
constitutional and statutory law.92 And that is a real problem for 
a coherence approach, which wants to hold both that religion is 
seldom special and that solutions must fit together with accepted 
judgments.93 
My response is twofold. First, coherence methodology 
takes into account not just existing statutes and judicial 
 
91 In recent work, serious political theorists seem to be coming to similar conclusions. 
Alan Patten, for instance, has suggested that “religious commitments are part of a class of 
special commitments that share some feature in common—e.g. they are connected with a 
claim to normative authority, they are important for personal identity, etc.—and that can 
be contrasted with ‘ordinary’ commitments that do not share the relevant feature . . . .” 
Alan Patten, Religious Exemptions and Fairness, in RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 212–13 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon, eds., 2017) (emphasis original). 
With respect to any particular value, on this approach, religion is unlikely to be special in 
the sense that it is unique. This is true even if we continue to call religion and all its 
supplements “special.” Patten says something a little different in another recent paper, 
where he suggests that religion could be replaced by a larger category that deserves 
special solicitude but subsumes religion. Alan Patten, The Normative Logic of Religious 
Liberty, 25 J. OF POL. PHIL. 129, 134–35 (2016). But he ends up suggesting that religion 
could be protected along with other commitments: “There is no tension involved in 
maintaining that [religion] should have such significance and in holding that certain non-
religious kinds of commitment should also be treated as having special significance.” Id., 
at 135. 
92 Laborde makes a similar point in her review of the book. Cécile Laborde, Religious 
Freedom, US Law, and Liberal Political Theory, J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. (forthcoming, 2018) 
(“The problem for Tebbe—and other US liberal legal constitutionalists—is that the 
constitutional system they seek to give ‘coherence’ to recognizes religious freedom as a 
special freedom; and yet their political theory is one that implicitly denies such status.”). 
93 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 2 (“I will focus on a deep tension between Tebbe’s 
devotion to reflective equilibrium and his conviction, stated at many points in the book, 
that ‘it is no longer clear that constitutional law should treat religious belief as special, as 
compared to nonreligious beliefs or nonbelief.’”). 
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authorities, but also constitutional provisions that may articulate 
commitments on a higher level of generality. It assimilates legal 
principles that abstract from, and account for, particular 
judgments embodied in statutes and cases. One such principle is 
fairness to others—the conviction that the government should not 
accommodate religious actors alone when others would like to 
engage in the same activity for comparably valuable reasons.94 
That principle can be appreciated from the government’s 
perspective as well. If the values animating a particular 
exemption point beyond religion, then limiting the provision to 
religious actors generates unfairness. Binding Establishment 
Clause doctrine includes a rule against that sort of unfairness. 
Second, legal authorities do not actually enforce religion’s 
specialness with consistency or without contradiction. Both 
Koppelman and Brownstein argue that existing statutory and 
constitutional provisions regularly single out religious actors for 
accommodation.95 That is true. However, the law is complicated 
and it also cuts against religion’s specialness.  
In cases concerning conscientious objection to the draft, 
for example, the Court interpreted a congressional statue that 
exempted only those who held a “religious” objection to war in all 
forms. Interpreting that provision, the Justices ordered 
accommodations for two draftees who were arguably 
nonbelievers. But there was a difficulty with its reasoning, 
namely that the Court based its holding on a dubious 
interpretation of the statute. After all, Congress had limited the 
exemption to draftees whose pacifism was grounded in “religious 
training and belief,” and it had specifically excluded “essentially 
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal 
moral code.”96  
Justice Harlan stated the obvious in his concurrence in 
Welsh v. United States—namely, that the Justices’ reading of the 
 
94 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 71–80 (defending the principle of fairness to others). 
95 Sometimes Koppelman goes further, as when he says that “American law 
consistently treats religion as special.” Koppelman, supra note 68, at 73 (emphasis 
original).  
96 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 456(j)). Congress defined religion as “‘an individual’s belief 
in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any 
human relation.’” Id. 
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statute was unwarranted. He nevertheless agreed that Welsh 
should win conscientious objector status, despite his arguable 
nonbelief, but Harlan felt that the result was grounded in the 
Establishment Clause, specifically its prohibition of “religious 
gerrymanders.”97 A statute cannot exclude nonbelievers who 
otherwise fall within its “radius.” In Welsh, the statute’s “radius” 
included everyone who conscientiously opposed war in general, 
and therefore it could not exclude nonbelievers without offending 
the First Amendment.98 Today, that has become the mainstream 
reading of Seeger and Welsh—they establish a constitutional rule 
of evenhandedness in accommodations.99 
Texas Monthly imparted a similar lesson, albeit less 
clearly.100 There, the Court invalidated a state sales tax 
exemption for periodicals published or distributed by a religious 
faith. Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality, explained that the 
class of exempted organizations or activities should fit the state’s 
purpose. If Texas’s aim was to “promote reflection and discussion 
about questions of ultimate value and the contours of a good or 
meaningful life,” then it had to include all publications that 
furthered that purpose, not just religious ones.101 To support that 
argument, Justice Brennan quoted the “religious gerrymanders” 
passage from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Welsh.102 His 
conclusion was less clear, however, because he also reasoned that 
the Texas statute actually had a religious purpose and endorsed 
religion.103 Still, the Court did strike down the statute because it 
impermissibly limited the exemption to religious actors, when 
nonreligious citizens would have fallen within the scope of any 
conceivable secular purpose. 
 
97 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356–57 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
98 Id. at 357. 
99 See, e.g., 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE 
AND FAIRNESS 61–62 (2006) (“Everyone agrees that the Court strained the [statute’s] 
language considerably in Seeger. Scholars widely assumed that the justices did so because 
they would have regarded an explicit line between objectors who believe in a traditional 
God and other religious objectors as unconstitutional.”); Id. at 63 (“In Welsh, . . . [a]s with 
Seeger, powerful doubts among the justices about a line between religious and 
nonreligious objectors almost certainly explained why they so deftly dispatched 
Congress’s attempt to draw just that line.”). 
100 See generally Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
101 Id. at 16. 
102 Id. at 17. 
103 Id. 
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Finally, the Court in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor struck 
down a Connecticut statute designed to help employees who 
observed a Sabbath. It held that the statute, which gave workers 
an absolute right to avoid work on their Sabbath, violated the 
Establishment Clause. Although the majority opinion focused on 
the harm to third parties—the employer and other employees—
Justice O’Connor wrote separately to note the unfairness to 
employees who might also like to choose their day off for reasons 
that were sincere and serious, including religious beliefs that did 
not happen to include a day of rest. She concluded that the 
statute violated the Establishment Clause in part because it 
exempted certain religious workers “without according similar 
accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of 
other private employees.”104 
Admittedly, the Court has also said that religious 
accommodations “need not ‘come packaged with benefits to 
secular entities.’”105 And many statutes, both federal and state, 
contain exemptions from general laws that apply only to religious 
actors. Brownstein and Koppelman cite these accommodations as 
evidence for their positive claim that religion is in fact special in 
American law, and they argue that a coherence approach will 
struggle to fit them together with a normative conviction that 
religion ought not to be a matter of special legal concern.  
But much of the time religion has no secular equivalent—
and in those situations, laws accommodate religious actors 
without unfairness. Consider the federal statute that carves out 
an exemption from the drug laws for Native Americans who use 
peyote in religious rituals.106 Because peyote is unpleasant to 
use, there are few if any nonreligious citizens who have a 
comparably strong interest in that practice.107 Or think of the 
 
104 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
105 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005) (quoting Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 
327, 338 (1987)). 
106 42 U.S.C. §1996a (2000). 
107 H.R. Rep. No. 103-675, at 7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404, 2409 
(“There is virtually no illegal trafficking in peyote—Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) data indicates that between 1980 and 1987, only 19.4 pounds of peyote was 
confiscated, while during the same period the DEA seized over 15 million pounds of 
marijuana.”); see also Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 917–18 (1990) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between marijuana and peyote).  
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exemption that allows military personnel to wear religious 
apparel despite uniform rules.108 Although many members of the 
armed forces would like to be able to express themselves through 
clothing and jewelry, it is unlikely that their interests compare to 
those of orthodox Jews or Sikhs who feel compelled to observe 
religious doctrines on dress. At the very least, singling out 
religious military members can be done without inordinate 
unfairness. And something similar is true for the vast majority of 
“retail” religious exemptions (i.e., those contained in specific 
statutes). 
Much the same may also be said for religious freedom 
statutes that are “wholesale,” meaning they apply across a range 
of contexts. Most often, they single out religious actors without 
working unfairness to others—and where they do operate 
unfairly, courts find ways to widen their protections. For 
example, the Cutter Court upheld the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).109 That law provides 
that government cannot substantially burden religious exercise 
(in prisons and land use) unless it can show that its policy is 
narrowly tailored to pursue a compelling interest.110 RLUIPA 
was challenged on Establishment Clause grounds precisely for 
the kind of unfairness I am considering here—and the lower 
court actually did strike it down for favoring religious inmates 
over others. When the Supreme Court reversed, it clarified that 
there was no reason to think that religious inmates were being 
preferred over nonreligious ones. It also observed that it was 
confronting a facial challenge to the statute; specific unfairness 
to a similarly-situated nonreligious inmate, should it arise, could 
be addressed in an as-applied challenge.111  
And in fact, where RLUIPA does risk special solicitude for 
religion, courts have crafted workarounds. For instance, the 
Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of a nonbelieving inmate, holding 
that he could not be prohibited from forming a weekly meeting 
group for atheists without violating the Establishment Clause.112 
 
108 10 U.S.C. § 774.  
109 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5. 
110 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–1. 
111 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724–25 (2005). 
112 Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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In an opinion by Judge Wood, the court reasoned that it would 
have been permissible to favor religious group meetings over 
ordinary meetings by social groups. To distinguish that 
hypothetical, Judge Wood found that atheism was a religion, and 
therefore that granting weekly meetings to traditional adherents 
but not to nonbelievers violated nonestablishment.113 
 So, in sum, unique care for religious interests is not as 
easy to square with existing practice as Brownstein and 
Koppelman suggest. Although judicial and legislative precedents 
are complex and even contradictory, they sometimes support the 
conviction that religious beliefs and practices should not be 
favored. They even support a principle of fairness to others, 
namely those who hold comprehensive commitments of 
conscience not grounded in religion.114  
Examples cited by Brownstein and Koppelman tend to 
feature religion-specific accommodations without sensitivity to 
whether they are working unfairness to comparable nonreligious 
commitments. Brownstein, for his part, spotlights RFRA and 
RLUIPA as key examples of religion’s specialness in American 
law.115 But, as I have just noted, the Supreme Court has clarified 
that where those laws do work unfairness to others, they may 
have to be modified. And lower courts like the one in Kaufman 
have used creative techniques, such as expanding the definition 
of the term “religion,” to avoid unfairness that would result from 
special exemptions for religious actors under such laws. 
Brownstein also offers the example of Section 702 of Title 
VII, which allows religious organizations to hire only members of 
the faith, despite the normal prohibition on religious 
discrimination in hiring.116 That law appears to permit religious 
employers (and only religious employers) to do something that 
nonreligious ones might like to do as well—namely, discriminate 
 
113 Id. 
114 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 71–80 (defending the principle of fairness to others). 
115 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 30 (“There are hundreds of religious 
accommodations in local, state and federal law, the overwhelming majority of which apply 
on their face to religion alone. Most notably, in addition the First Amendment which 
speaks of religion, not conscience, there is the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), numerous state RFRAs, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (RLUIPA) . . . .”). 
116 Id. (listing as an example of special treatment of religion “the exemption in Title 
VII for religious organizations” and citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)). 
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on the basis of religion. However, the exemption could be 
understood to ensure evenhandedness for religious groups, not to 
frustrate it. After all, nonreligious organizations already have 
the ability to exclude workers who do not share their ideological 
preferences—say, for environmentalism or against abortion. 
Section 702 simply puts religious organizations on the same 
footing, on this view.117 (Remember that Section 702 does not 
accommodate all religious discrimination; it only permits a 
preference for people of the same faith.118) If that reading is 
right, then this example actually cuts against special solicitude 
for religion. 
Koppelman, for his part, cites as his main example the 
“ministerial exception,” which is a constitutional doctrine that 
allows religious congregations to hire and fire clergy without 
regard to employment discrimination laws.119 He believes that 
this doctrine evidences the specialness of religion. But there is a 
nonreligious equivalent to the ministerial exception, namely 
freedom of association. Under that rule, any voluntary 
organization can win protection from civil rights laws if it can 
show that it needs that latitude in order to further its expressive 
mission. For example, a Boy Scouts troop may fire a scoutmaster 
who comes out as gay, if that is required by its moral code.120 I 
have more to say about that doctrine below.121 But for now, my 
point is simply that religious and nonreligious organizations 
 
117 I argue for this interpretation in the book. TEBBE, supra note 11, at 155 (“[Secular 
c]lose associations should have the ability to select employees who share their basic 
commitments, meaning environmental groups can hire only environmentalists, even 
outside policy roles. And Section 702 allows religious groups similar leeway by letting 
them choose workers of the same faith.”). 
118 Section 702 only allows religious employers to prefer co-religionists; it does not 
allow them to engage in other forms of religious discrimination. It is conceivable that an 
atheist employer might refuse to hire all religious employees. But even if Section 702 
applied to atheists, it would not allow that exclusion—it only permits an employer to 
prefer members of the same sect. So an atheist employer would be able to prefer atheists 
over all believers and other types of secular applicants, such as agnostics, but it could not 
target only religious employees for exclusion. Another reason for that conclusion is that 
religious people may be nonbelievers—for instance, observant Jews can be atheists, as can 
practicing Theravada Buddhists. 
119 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 3. The ministerial exemption may relieve 
congregations from other laws as well. See Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise 
Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183, 1201–05 
(2014). 
120 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000). 
121 See infra Part III.D. 
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should be seen to have similar degree of freedom to hire and fire 
leaders in ways that otherwise would be prevented by civil rights 
laws. And to the degree that the Speech and Free Exercise 
Clauses offer divergent protection for associations, they should be 
rethought in light of equality guarantees.  
Koppelman also objects that my approach presents a “big 
problem,” namely that it would require courts to inquire into 
theological questions in violation of the common wisdom that 
judges should not pronounce on questions of religious truth.122 I 
think his concern is understandable but overstated.  
First of all, some associational interests should prevail 
regardless of the content of their beliefs. In those cases, 
Koppelman’s problem simply does not arise. For example, both 
secular and sacred organizations should have control over hiring 
leaders irrespective of whether their missions demand a 
particular form of discrimination—if the organizations are 
intimate enough to qualify as close associations.123 Democratic 
governments must leave some room for civil society to shape the 
wills and worldviews of citizens, including in illiberal ways.124 
Moreover, it would be inappropriate for government to limit this 
protection to demands that are clearly dictated by the doctrine of 
such organizations. Close associations require latitude to 
discover and debate ideas—without losing protection if their 
commitments are less than fully formed.125 So my argument 
there does not require courts to determine the content of anyone’s 
beliefs. 
 
122 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 3–4; see also Brownstein, supra note 12, at 39 
(“[S]ome discriminatory decisions by religious values organizations may be determined to 
be required by the organization’s mission while discriminatory decisions by other religious 
organizations may be determined to be inadequately connected to the organization’s 
mission. A legal framework that results in certain religious associations being permitted 
to discriminate while other, arguably similar, associations are denied such exemptions 
undermines our commitment to religious neutrality.”) 
123 TEBBE, supra note 11, at 80–98. 
124 Here I follow Seana Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 
99 NW. U. L. REV. 865, 865–866 (2005), and Lawrence Sager, Why Churches (and, 
Possibly, the Tarpon Bay Women’s Blue Water Fishing Club) Can Discriminate, in THE 
RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: HOBBY LOBBY AND THE NEW LAW OF RELIGION IN 
AMERICA   ,     Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, and  o e Robinson, eds. 2016). 
125 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 84. I identify factors that constitutional actors can 
use to identify close associations, including “size, bureaucracy, selectivity, exclusivity, 
commercialism, and orientation to the expression or implementation of ideas or values.” 
Id. 
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Second, groups that are larger and looser should still 
enjoy some deference on questions of mission. Associations that 
propagate ideas might need some protection from state control 
over employment of policy leaders, particularly where that 
control is necessary for the group to espouse unorthodox ideas. 
Even bureaucratic institutions may require this latitude. But 
these “values organizations” can and should be required to show 
that employment exclusion is required by their missions in order 
to qualify for exemptions from antidiscrimination laws.126 That 
requirement follows from the primary rationale for protecting 
such organizations from civil rights law in the first place, namely 
allowing them to promote unorthodox ideas in democratic 
discourse. Such groups do not require as much latitude to choose 
their leaders as close associations do—they should be required to 
show that a particular form of exclusion is required by their 
mission. Because these groups are fully formed and rationalized, 
their missions will be well developed and discernable. Even so, 
however, I support the current rule that courts should defer to 
the organizations on the question of what their beliefs really are, 
and what forms of exclusion they require for faithful elaboration 
and expression.127  
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to interpret 
theologies for two principal reasons: because judges lack 
competence on such matters and because they must guarantee 
government neutrality with respect to religions.128 But here, it 
seems unlikely that courts will lack the competence to ascertain 
the missions or values of organizations; it also seems unlikely 
that they will risk any unfairness by doing so.129 Judges must 
 
126 Id. at 85. 
127 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (“As we give deference to 
an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give 
deference to an association’s view of what would impair its expression.”) 
128 See Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach To Religious Doctrine: What Are 
We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 857 (2009) (describing the incompetence 
concern); id. at 858 (describing the government neutrality and noninterference rationale 
and citing Koppelman). See also, e.g., Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Church, 344 U.S. 94, 125 
(1952) (“under our Constitution it is not open to the governments of this Union to 
reinforce the loyalty of their citizens by deciding who is the true exponent of their 
religion”). 
129 Cf. LABORDE, supra note 26, at 127 (arguing that some theological claims can be 
assessed by courts, and noting by way of example that “[i]f a religious association asserts 
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simply ask representatives of the group what its commitments 
require.130 Any group that qualifies as a values organization will 
already have articulated those commitments. 
Even if I am wrong about that, however—and Koppelman 
does have a point when he says that courts properly refuse to 
adjudicate theological questions131—the conclusion need not be 
that religious associations are treated differently in American 
law. First, it is far from clear that government officials have any 
greater competence to discern the moral convictions of secular 
organizations, especially on comparably profound questions like 
complicity with abortion or contraception.132 As Laborde argues, 
the “competence” rationale for associational freedom extends to 
certain nonreligious interests as well.133 Perhaps for that reason, 
 
in its defense that a minister violated a tenet against adultery, this is an objectively 
testable religious justification.”) 
130 Moreover, it is hard to understand why either danger would be categorically 
different for moral beliefs than for religious ones. Both competence and non-neutrality 
would seem to be concerns with respect to associations organized around moral 
commitments as well. Yet courts’ ability to discern a group’s moral mission (in a 
deferential way) does not seem to be terribly controversial. 
131 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2778–79 (2014) 
(refusing to question Hobby Lobby’s contention that providing contraception coverage to 
employees would substantially burden its leaders religious beliefs.) 
132 Justice Alito, writing for the Court in Hobby Lobby, seemed to indicate in dicta 
that the Court is prohibited from second-guessing not just religious commitments of 
citizens, but moral and philosophical ones as well: 
The Hahns and Greens believe that providing the coverage demanded 
by the HHS regulations is connected to the destruction of an embryo 
in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to provide the 
coverage. This belief implicates a difficult and important question of 
religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under 
which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in 
itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission 
of an immoral act by another. Arrogating the authority to provide a 
binding national answer to this religious and philosophical question, 
HHS and the principal dissent in effect tell the plaintiffs that their 
beliefs are flawed. For good reason, we have repeatedly refused to take 
such a step. See, e.g., [Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 
(1990)] (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned 
that courts must not presume to determine . . . the plausibility of a 
religious claim”); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 
(1989); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969). 
Id. at 2778 (emphasis added). 
 
133 LABORDE, supra note 26, at 114; id. at 129 (“Religious associations, then, have 
competence-interests which justify that courts show judicial deference in their 
adjudication of ministerial employment disputes. But are they the only associations that 
have such interests, and the employment discretion that they justify? They are not.”). 
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current law already requires courts to defer to expressive 
associations when it comes to identifying their message.134 
Second, government failure of neutrality can raise the same 
danger of official favoritism for nonreligious groups, at least 
when they are expressing commitments that are integrated with 
members’ ideology and identity.  
As a coda to this Part, let me address Koppelman’s 
observation that “Tebbe seems to be drawn to liberal neutrality,” 
which he defines as the “claim[] that state action should never be 
justified on the basis of any contested conception of the good.”135 
Actually, my view is somewhat different. A government could 
hardly operate under such a strict conception of neutrality. 
Rather, my position is closer to the conviction that government 
must guarantee full and equal citizenship for everyone in the 
polity. The guarantee of full and equal membership entails 
government evenhandedness, but it is limited to situations where 
bias would denigrate citizenship status or interfere with basic 
freedoms. In the next Part, I sketch that approach. 
III. From Method to Theory 
Constitutional actors need a method for resolving pitched 
conflicts between religious freedom and equality law. Serious 
thinkers on both sides are arguing that no such method exists, or 
can exist. Their reasons for this diagnosis vary. But their 
 
Laborde uses academic decisions about tenure to exemplify the competence limitations on 
courts with regard to nonreligious groups. Id. 
    That the state may be incompetent to assess some nonreligious commitments is 
not addressed in Lupu and Tuttle’s strongly-worded rejection of the claim that the 
ministerial exception may be an instance of a broader right of associational freedom. See 
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1304–10 (2017). 
They argue that the ministerial exception is grounded exclusively in the concern about 
government competence to decide religious questions, that this is a place where “religion 
must have a distinctive meaning” in constitutional law, and that the shield against 
antidiscrimination law is “jurisdictional.” Id. at 1306–07. But Lupu and Tuttle do not 
consider the possibility that government incompetence may extend to certain nonreligious 
commitments as well.  
134 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000). 
135 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 2–3. Cf. Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1080 & n.6 
(defining “neutralitarian liberals” as “liberals who claim that the law should be neutral 
among all contested conceptions of the good” and noting that “[Micah] Schwartzman is 
attracted to this position”). For an influential argument against liberal neutrality, see 
Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (“I will defend 
government advancement of specific, perhaps contested, conceptions of the good”). 
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conclusions are remarkably consistent—they maintain that 
disputes on these questions cannot be resolved with reasons.136 
In the book, I propose a coherence method for reaching 
solutions that are backed by reasons. No foundation undergirds 
this approach, which remains dynamic rather than static. 
Moreover, it accepts and even accents the reality that judgments 
on matters of religious freedom are often colored by interests and 
ideologies. Importantly, the method is not inherently 
conservative or atavistic. On the contrary, it is engineered to 
stimulate a search for justifications for views we might hold 
reflexively. In Part II of the book, I then infer principles for 
resolving conflicts at the intersection of free exercise and civil 
rights law. Four principles in particular seem to be doing much of 
the work in contemporary conversations: avoiding harm to 
others, fairness to others, freedom of association, and 
government nonendorsement.137 In the third and final part, I 
deploy that method and those principles to suggest solutions to 
ground-level problems. Four areas of civil rights law have been 
most prominent, namely public accommodations, employment 
discrimination, public funding, and government officials.138 
Although my conclusions often match the intuitions of left-
egalitarians, they do not invariably track them. And the fact that 
that the method generates surprises is some evidence of its 
integrity. Importantly, even where my proposals are congenial to 
those on the left, they are undergirded by reasons that carry 
their own authority and that must be confronted by people who 
disagree. 
Some contributors to this symposium are pushing me to 
move beyond method and to articulate a theory of religious 
freedom. I decided not to do that in the book because I wanted to 
 
136 See Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1893, 1895 (2009); id. at 1906 (“[T]he various pronouncements of 
judges and scholars in this domain come to look like a thinly veiled exercise in ipse 
dixit.”). Policy prescriptions for addressing this situation differ. Some recommend leaving 
religious freedom questions to legislatures. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER 
EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 6, 68 (2001); 
POSNER, supra note 56, at x (“[T]he limitations of moral and constitutional theory provide 
a compelling argument for judicial self-restraint”). Roderick Hills would devolve questions 
about religious freedom to state and local governments. HILLS, supra note 56, at 3. 
137 TEBBE, supra note 11, at 49–114. 
138 Id. at 115–197. 
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stay focused on the intricate relationship between religious 
freedom and equality law. But in his review, Alan Brownstein is 
asking how the positions I take fit together into a framework for 
thinking about free exercise and nonestablishment—or even the 
First Amendment more generally. 
In particular, Brownstein wonders how it is possible to 
hold these two commitments at the same time: 1) that religion 
ought not to enjoy special regard in constitutional law, and 2) 
that the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause 
ought to be vigorously enforced.139 That is the question I address 
in this Part. Although I cannot articulate a full theory of 
religious freedom here, I can sketch the outlines of an account 
that both denies that religion is special and imposes serious 
constraints on government regulation and endorsement of 
religion, conscience, belief, thought, and opinion.  
Before I explain that argument, let me highlight how 
much Brownstein and I share. First, we agree that religious 
actors should sometimes receive exemptions from general laws. 
Unlike some other egalitarians, I defend RFRA, which I think is 
important for the protection of religious minorities.140 I also 
maintain that there should be a constitutional basis for religious 
exemptions (although strict scrutiny is too high a standard for 
considering such claims). Therefore, I reject the Court’s 
suggestion in Employment Division v. Smith that incidental 
burdens on religion never present a constitutional difficulty.141 I 
 
139 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 15. 
140 Compare IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS 
PEOPLE 228, 226–47 (2014) (noting “serious constitutional difficulties” with asking judges 
to the theological import of government regulation, as RFRA and RLUIPA do). My 
support for RFRA may intensify problems with the claim that religion should not be 
special in American law. However, I believe there are mechanisms for managing that 
tension, in particular a flexible definition of religion, supported above in Part I, and 
constitutional requirements of evenhandedness, discussed in Part II.  
141 See Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 
699, 731 (2005); cf. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith 
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1128 (1990) (proposing a test that is stronger than 
“toothless rationality review” but “recast[s] the ‘compelling interest’ test in a more 
realistic form”). In fact, even the Smith Court carves out exceptions to its main rule which 
provide a constitutional basis for religious exemptions. See Nelson Tebbe, Smith in Theory 
and Practice, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2055, 2056–57 (2011). The Supreme Court’s subsequent 
jurisprudence has provided further doctrinal mechanisms for religious exemptions. For 
example, the Court recognized the ministerial exemption, which provides a constitutional 
exemption from employment discrimination laws, even though those laws are neutral and 
generally applicable. Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 
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also agree with Brownstein that the Establishment Clause 
provides a strong guarantee against government endorsement of 
religious commitments and purposive funding of religious 
activities.  
More profoundly, Brownstein and I share a certain form of 
pluralism, specifically the view that no single rule or rubric can 
do all the conceptual and doctrinal work across the broad range 
of First Amendment issues—only variegated values can explain 
and justify outcomes in cases concerning free exercise, non-
establishment, and freedom of expression.142 These are 
significant points of accord, and they make more interesting the 
differences between our positions. In short, Brownstein wants to 
know how someone who shares those commitments can also 
maintain that religious and nonreligious commitments can and 
should be protected and burdened concomitantly.  
 A. Full and Equal Membership 
The religion clauses of the First Amendment work to 
ensure that everyone is able to exercise basic liberties, and that 
they face the government and each other on equal footing, 
without stratification or subordination. This is the core 
commitment of full and equal membership, a vision of political 
morality that is shared among many egalitarian theorists, albeit 
often in a vague sort of way.143 Rather than a master concept, it 
 
132 S.Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (attempting to distinguish Smith by saying that Smith “involved 
government regulation of only outward physical acts”). 
142 Compare Alan Brownstein, Why Conservatives, and Others, Have Trouble 
Supporting the Meaningful Enforcement of Free Exercise Rights, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 925, 929 (2010) (“[R]eligion is a multidimensional constitutional interest which 
subsumes and implicates several independently recognized constitutional values.”), with 
Tebbe, supra note 16, at 1127–30 (describing and defending religion-clause pluralism). 
Brownstein and I are not alone in our pluralist orientation to religious freedom. See, e.g., 
MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 3 (2013) (“[T]he values 
which swirl around the conflicts of religious liberty are incompatible and 
incommensurable.”); 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 1 (2008) (“Neither free exercise nor nonestablishment is 
reducible to any single value; many values count.”); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE RELIGIOUS 
LEFT AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 2 (2009) (“[T]he religion clauses are supported by 
pluralistic foundations.”). 
143 I have suggested this approach in parts of previous works. See TEBBE, supra note 
11, at 72–73; Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 649–50 
(2013). For one recent articulation of full and equal citizenship in the context of religious 
freedom theory, see Jean L. Cohen, Rethinking Political Secularism and the American 
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is a theme or guide for constitutional actors who must manage 
the variegated commitments that animate First Amendment 
doctrines. 
In brief, full membership means that everyone can 
exercise fundamental freedoms and basic human capacities. 
Those include the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech and 
association, and the formation of thought, belief, and opinion, 
among others. As Madison put it in the Memorial and 
Remonstrance, “[t]he Religion then of every man must be left to 
the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of 
every man to exercise it as these may dictate.”144 This need not 
be just a matter of belief or opinion, but also conduct or action. 
For example, Madison asks “[w]ho does not see . . . that the same 
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only 
of his property for the support of any one establishment, may 
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases 
whatsoever?”145 Both freedom of belief and its manifestation in 
practice are basic.146  
Equal membership signifies protection against 
subordination of any class of citizens, including those defined by 
religion. To draw on Madison once more, the Virginia bill to 
support clergy offended equality because it “degrades from the 
 
Model of Constitutional Dualism, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 115 (Jean L. Cohen & Cécile Laborde, eds., 2016) (“The dualist constitutional 
framework thus helped constitute the political principles central to a civil-republican, 
liberal-democratic polity: equal civil standing and rights for every citizen, personal and 
political freedom, and the pursuit of public purposes by the political community as a 
whole supported and watched over by a diverse yet vigilant citizenry.”). 
144 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ASSESSMENTS para. 1, 15 (n.p. 1785), http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.html. 
145 Id. at para. 3. 
146 I offer Madison here not because of his authority for originalist interpretation, but 
just as a persuasive guide to central constitutional commitments. Cf. EISGRUBER & 
SAGER, supra note 61, at 52–53 (insisting “on a broad understanding of constitutional 
liberty generally . . . all persons—whether engaged in religiously inspired enterprises or 
not—enjoy rights of free speech, personal autonomy, associative freedom, and private 
property that, while neither uniquely relevant to religion nor defined in terms of religion, 
will allow religious practice to flourish”). My approach differs only insofar as it allows for 
a separately defined freedom of religion that nevertheless enjoys no priority over other 
constitutional rights. As Madison puts it, “the equal right of every citizen to the free 
exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience is held by the same tenure 
with all our other rights.” MADISON, supra note 133, at para. 15 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not 
bend to those of the Legislative authority.”147 In another passage, 
Madison said “the Bill violates that equality which ought to be 
the basis of every law.”148 Equal membership is vulnerable when 
the government imposes special burdens on a sect, and it can also 
be violated when the government grants “extraordinary 
privileges” to a particular denomination.149 
Of course, there is much more that can and should be said 
about this twofold normative framework. Here, my point is 
relatively narrow: just that the framework facilitates an 
understanding of the First Amendment that makes sense of 
religious freedom—including both free exercise and 
nonestablishment—without unjustifiably singling out religious 
beliefs and practices. So when the Free Exercise Clause prohibits 
government from discriminating on the basis of religion, say, it 
does so not because of any unique characteristic but because of a 
more general principle of equality that protects all groups that 
are susceptible to systematic stratification.150 Or when free 
exercise law demands exemptions from general laws, that is not 
because of concerns that apply solely to religious actors, but 
because of a commitment to freedom of belief and practice that 
includes comparable nonreligious manifestations of conscience. 
Much the same could be said of the various aspects of 
nonestablishment and free speech law.151 
In other words, the scope and strength of constitutional 
and statutory protections are driven by their underlying 
substantive concerns, which cannot include a simple preference 
for religious actors without working considerable unfairness. 
Protecting full and equal membership is consistent with the 
response to religion’s specialness set out in the last part: religion 
 
147 Id., at para. 9. 
148 Id. at para. 4. 
149 Id. 
150 Cf. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 61, at 52–53 (“[N]o members of our political 
community ought to be devalued on account of the spiritual foundations of their 
important commitments and projects. Religious faith receives special constitutional 
solicitude in this respect, but only because of its vulnerability to hostility and neglect.”). 
151 On nonestablishment of nonreligious ideas, see Tebbe, supra note 143, at 649, 
709–10. On the puzzling differences between speech and religion law, see Tebbe, supra 
note 44, at 1296–98, 1301–03. 
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need not be jettisoned as a category, but it will benefit from 
protections, or face prohibitions, alongside nonreligious 
commitments that are similarly situated relative to the relevant 
constitutional values. So full and equal membership is not a 
substitute for constitutional protection of religion, but instead an 
interpretive guide for courts seeking to guarantee religious 
freedom alongside comparable commitments. 
As I explained in Part II.B, treating the religion clauses as 
manifestations of constitutional commitments that reach more 
broadly is consistent with much existing law. And, in fact, it 
helps to make sense of seemingly anomalous elements of the 
doctrine, such as the conscientious objector cases or the 
ministerial exception. But the approach also elicits several sorts 
of objections—some of them quite powerful. 
 B. General Objections 
Perhaps the most powerful argument against a 
disaggregated approach to the First Amendment is that 
vindicating constitutional values directly is unworkable using the 
existing institutions of state power. As background, recall the 
argument that law regularly uses familiar categories to 
implement underlying purposes, rather than trying to pursue 
those objectives directly. As noted above, criminal statutes do not 
direct citizens to simply “drive safely,” even if that is their 
underlying objective, because that standard would be difficult to 
enforce.152 Instead, laws impose speed limits, they require 
drivers to pass a license test, they prohibit driving while 
intoxicated, and the like.153  
Similarly, on this view, constitutional law uses religion as 
a category for administering values such as individual autonomy, 
government nondiscrimination, national unity, and so forth. 
American law could not simply say “people have a right to hold 
profound beliefs and to engage in associated practices.”154 That 
would risk unfairness, because judges and lawmakers would 
 
152 See supra Part II.A. 
153 See Koppelman, supra note 68, at 71, 77–78. 
154 See Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1082–83 (arguing that Eisgruber and Sager’s 
principle that the government should protect all “‘deep’ commitments” is “simply not 
administrable”). 
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disagree about which beliefs are profound, and what it means to 
exercise them. It could also undermine the rule of law, because 
judges’ rulings might not be predictable or impersonal. So the 
First Amendment deploys recognized social categories—such as 
religion and speech—to implement constitutional commitments. 
That is the administrability or proxy argument for retaining the 
category of religion, and it has considerable strength.155 But the 
category of religion is underinclusive or overinclusive with 
respect to virtually every commitment that drives the First 
Amendment. And that results in basic unfairness, as I have been 
arguing.156  
So the next question—and the one I wish to address in 
this section—is whether it would be workable to add categories of 
protected or prohibited beliefs and practices. Some such 
categories seem perfectly administrable in some contexts—think 
of accommodating conscientious opposition to the draft.157 Or 
think of protecting nonbelievers from government discrimination, 
in the same manner that religious practitioners are protected. 
Conscientious objection and nonbelief are socially recognized 
phenomena that courts can identify at least as easily as religion 
itself. And although supplementing religion in this way would 
not eliminate all unfairness, it would mitigate constitutional 
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness.158 Fairness seems to 
require at least that much. 
Perhaps someone with this objection could respond that 
such a system would be too complex. Not only would protected 
categories proliferate, but the list would vary with the particular 
doctrine within First Amendment law. For example, atheists may 
require protection against government discrimination, even if 
their belief system does not demand practices that need to be 
accommodated.159  
 
155 See Lund, supra note 62, at 486, 514–15; see also Brownstein, supra note 12, at 30. 
156 See supra Part II.A. 
157 Schwartzman, supra note 89, at 1093–94.  
158 Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1083 (observing that adding conscience to religion 
as a protected category “will diminish, but not eliminate, the law’s imperfection”). 
159 For example, Michael McConnell seems to believe that atheism requires protection 
against discrimination, but that it does not generate beliefs that government can or must 
accommodate through exemptions. Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10–11 (1986) (“[U]nbelief entails no obligations and no observances. 
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Yet complexity should not be confused with 
unworkability. Legal professionals are fully capable of handling 
intricate doctrines. If the concern is that courts will be regularly 
required to make unguided judgments in order to determine legal 
outcomes, then the answer is that expanding the list of protected 
beliefs and practices does not require them to do that in an 
extraordinary way. 
A second general objection is that using the term religion 
allows the state to remain neutral among faiths. Avoiding direct 
discussion of underlying values allows officials to avoid having to 
say that some denominations promote those values—say, 
autonomy of belief or equality of persons—while others do not.160 
Religion is a general enough category to allow the government to 
maintain this neutrality among sects or denominations. 
My approach is not vulnerable to that objection because it 
retains the category of religion. Conversely, however, relying on 
religion alone to implement underlying constitutional values 
results in a distinct and definite kind of unevenness. We should 
be no more willing to tolerate that kind of bias than we are 
willing to tolerate nonneutrality among sects. 
 C. Avoiding Harm to Others 
A theory of religious freedom oriented toward full and 
equal membership may draw other objections that are more 
specific. Critics may ask whether rejecting the specialness of 
religion can be squared with vigorous enforcement of free 
exercise and nonestablishment in particular areas of law.  
Take this fascinating problem, for instance. One of the 
principles that properly guides thinking about conflicts between 
 
Unbelief may be coupled with various sorts of moral conviction . . . . But these convictions 
must necessarily be derived from some source other than unbelief itself.”). I take a 
different view—and I identify practices that nonbelievers may well claim are required by 
their belief system and ought to be accommodated by government. For example, atheist 
inmates may wish to hold weekly meetings to discuss their convictions, or they may want 
to receive relevant literature, despite prison censorship rules. Such exemption claims 
have in fact been brought, and some of them have been successful. Tebbe, supra note 16, 
at 1156–57 (citing cases). 
160 Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1080. 
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religious freedom and equality law is the commitment of avoiding 
harm to others.161  
Normally, when government exempts observant citizens 
from general laws, any associated costs are borne by the 
government itself or by the public. That is unobjectionable (on 
these grounds). But sometimes government accommodation of 
religious citizens results in harm to other private citizens, and 
when it does constitutional difficulties may arise. Third parties 
can experience coercion and unfairness, raising concerns under 
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. The 
principle that emerges is that government should avoid harm to 
others when it accommodates religious citizens. That rule is 
normatively attractive, and it is embodied in much Supreme 
Court doctrine, if not all.162 
How does that analysis change if religious is no longer 
special in constitutional law? Can it possibly be the case that all 
exemptions from general laws raise constitutional concerns when 
they shift harm to others? That’s the fascinating question that is 
now being raised by Brownstein and other commentators.163 
Of course, it proves too much to say that every exemption 
from a general law is impermissible if it shifts harm from some 
citizens to others. For example, disability law requires employers 
to accommodate disabled workers, yet that law is legitimate even 
if it results in increased costs to the employer and even if it 
results in burdens on other employees.164 Affirmative action 
programs in university admissions may impact nonminority 
 
161 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 49–70 (defending the principle of “avoiding harm to 
others”); see also Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman, & Richard Schragger, When Do 
Religious Accommodations Burden Others? in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE 
BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY (Susanna Mancini & Michel 
Rosenfeld eds., forthcoming 2018); Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard 
Schragger, How Much May Religious Accommodations Burden Others? in LAW, RELIGION, 
AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 215–29 (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen, 
and Elizabeth Sepper, eds., 2017). 
162 For a defense, see TEBBE, supra note 11, at 52–59. 
163 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 26–28. 
164 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination against disabled employees); 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (defining “discrimination” in part as “not making reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity 
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business of such covered entity”). 
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applicants.165 And free speech law might require exemptions 
from general laws that incidentally burden expression—and 
normally those exemptions are permissible even if they 
externalize costs onto other citizens.166 So there cannot be a 
universal rule against constitutional claims that negatively 
impact third parties.  
Yet it may well be the case that some nonreligious 
exemptions can be impermissible because they shift costs to 
others. To determine this—according to the theory I have been 
outlining—it is necessary to refer to the values animating the 
principle against harm to others. Two concerns are doing most of 
the work.167 First, there is a worry about coercion concerning a 
fundamental right: individuals ought not to be forced by the 
government to subsidize religious beliefs that they reject. That 
insight drove much of the opposition to colonial establishments, 
and it operates here as well.168 Of course, citizens are forced 
through taxation to support many policies they disagree with—
but they suffer a different kind of harm, on this view, when they 
bear costs because of the religious commitments of other private 
citizens.169  
Second, there is a concern about equal standing before the 
government.170 Normally, when law accommodates private beliefs 
its purpose and effect is simply to show concern for government 
burdens on religious exercise. However, when it accommodates 
certain private beliefs by shifting harm to other private citizens 
that stratifies classes of citizens according to basic identity 
characteristics. That too transforms an ordinary government act 
into a violation of an individual right. 
 
165 I am thankful to Katherine Franke and Kira Shepherd for raising this equal 
protection concern. 
166 Cf. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2526 (2014) (carving out a speech 
exemption from a Massachusetts law that created a 35-foot buffer zone around abortion 
clinics).  
167 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 53–54. 
168 Id. at 52. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 
317, 319 (2011) (reviewing the argument that “government spending to advance religion 
imposes special burdens on the freedom of conscience in a way that other controversial 
government expenditures do not”). 
169 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 53–54. 
170 See id. at 54. 
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Do these two concerns have any application to 
nonreligious commitments of conscience, belief, thought, or 
opinion? They do, as it turns out, but that does not mean that the 
rule against harm to others applies to all nonreligious 
commitments.  
Take for example Seeger and Welsh, the cases concerning 
conscientious objectors to the draft.171 In those cases, the 
Supreme Court held that pacifists who were arguably 
nonbelievers could claim conscientious objector status on the 
same terms as religious pacifists.172 Would someone who is sent 
to the battlefield in the place of Seeger or Welsh suffer coercion 
or denigration of the relevant sort? Quite possibly. That person 
could justifiably say that they were drafted because of 
conscientious beliefs that they rejected. They might hold, for 
instance, that this particular war is immoral, without holding 
that all wars are morally unjustified, as required by the 
conscientious objector statute.173 They then would be forced to 
bear a serious cost—risk of bodily harm and compelled conduct 
that they consider immoral—because the government exempted 
another private citizen with different beliefs.174  
Even if that is right, Seeger and Welsh might still be 
correctly decided, but reason would not be that the principle of 
harm to others has no application to nonreligious 
commitments.175 Instead, it would be that there is no—or only an 
attenuated—causal connection between the exemption of Seeger 
or Welsh and the drafting of any other identifiable citizen.176 
Conscription laws contain so many exemptions, and leave 
officials so much discretion, that no one sent to the battlefield 
 
171 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 164 (1965); Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333, 335 
(1970). 
172 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187–88; Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343–44. 
173 See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 164–65. It is less obvious that such a draftee could 
complain that the government was rendering them subordinate, but the idea would be 
that the government was advantaging one profound commitment of conscience over 
another. 
174 What would the legal source of a nonreligious third-party harm rule be? Would it 
be the Establishment Clause, or some other provision? Brownstein, supra note 142, at 
927. 
175 See 380 U.S. at 187–88; 398 U.S. at 343–44. 
176 See generally Seeger, 380 U.S. 163; Welsh, 398 U.S. 333. 
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would be able to point to a conscientious objector as the reason 
that they were put in harm’s way.177  
Or imagine a situation where an employer seeks and wins 
an exemption from the contraception mandate because of a 
nonreligious objection to (certain forms of) contraception. March 
for Life was that kind of employer: it was a secular pro-life 
nonprofit organization that objected on grounds of conscience to 
paying for its employees’ contraception coverage.178 And March 
for Life did win an exemption in a lower court (albeit on equal 
protection grounds).179 Would that result violate the rule against 
harm to others in the relevant sense? Again, that is conceivable. 
Employees of such an organization could rightly claim that they 
were being forced by the government to bear costs—loss of 
coverage—associated with profound conscientious beliefs that 
differ markedly from their own. They could justifiably worry that 
the government was taking sides in a fight between employers 
and employees on a matter of profound conscience. Now that the 
Trump Administration has created an exemption from the 
contraception mandate for employers with moral (as well as 
religious) objections to contraception, without providing 
alternative contraception coverage, the prospect of nonreligious 
third-party harms has increased significantly.180 
Yet again, the values behind the rule against harm to 
others would not frustrate all nonreligious accommodations. 
Most do not implicate the fundamental liberty or equality 
interests of others. Think again of accommodations for disabled 
employees, or exemptions from general laws that impose an 
incidental burden on speech (on matters that do not involve 
conscience or comprehensive morality). So the argument that the 
principle of avoiding harm to others could not possibly be 
 
177 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 57–58. 
178 March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 122 (D.D.C. 2015). 
179 Id. at 128. In a similar case, the Third Circuit disallowed a secular pro-life 
organization from an exemption, reasoning that the exemption was specific to religious 
objections and that the organization did not fall under the definition of religion. Real 
Alternatives, Inc. v. Secretary Dept. of Health and Human Services, 867 F.3d 338, 349–52 
(3rd Cir. 2017). 
180 See 82 Fed. Reg. 47838 (Oct. 6, 2017). Very likely, the Trump Administration 
promulgated a moral exemption, in addition to a religious one, in response to March for 
Life v. Burwell.  
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extended to nonreligious commitments without unsettling a great 
number of exemptions is overstated. Lines can be drawn. 
Work remains to be done on the general issue of the cost 
of rights, especially regarding the doctrine’s underpinnings in 
political theory. Exactly which nonreligious convictions will 
trigger the rule against harm to others? Exactly when will 
deprivation of a welfare-state benefit constitute harm in the 
relevant sense?181 These and other questions must be answered, 
but they are answerable. 
Brownstein also raises a more practical question. He 
notices that I limit the principle to cases where the harm to 
others rises to the level of “undue hardship” and he asks whether 
courts should be entrusted with administration of such a 
standard.182 He reminds readers that the Court eliminated free 
exercise exemptions in Employment Division v. Smith largely 
because it believed that courts could not administer the old 
balancing regime without arbitrariness and indeterminacy.183 If 
judges can administer the undue hardship standard in the 
Establishment Clause context, he asks, is there any reason to 
support the Smith Court’s view that they cannot balance private 
and public interests in the free exercise context?184  
My answer is that judicial balancing is tolerable in both 
contexts, despite dangers that should lead us to impose limits 
where practicable. With regard to the undue hardship standard, 
lower courts have been using it to decide Title VII cases for years 
without apparent injustice.185 Moreover, the body of precedent 
 
181 We have taken steps toward answering the baseline question for legal purposes. 
See Tebbe et al., When Do Religious Accommodations Harm Others?, supra note 161.  
182 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 62–66; see also Tebbe et al., How Much May 
Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, supra note 161, at 219–20. 
183 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
184 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 23–24 (“[I]f a balancing test may be reasonably and 
effectively employed under the Establishment Clause to invalidate unacceptably 
burdensome accommodations, is there any reason to continue to support the Smith 
opinion’s argument that the balancing of religious freedom and state interests is so 
difficult and constitutionally improper that it requires dramatically limiting the scope of 
free exercise rights[?]”). 
185 Courts have deployed the undue hardship standard as a real balancing test, not a 
de facto rule against religious accommodations, despite the Court’s strict interpretation of 
that test as permitting nothing more than “de minimis” harm to others. See Tebbe et al., 
How Much May Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, supra note 161, at 221–22. It 
is true that courts sometimes defend themselves by saying that Congress actually struck 
the balance when it adopted the undue hardship standard, and that they are merely 
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that they have developed can guide courts who deploy the same 
standard to limit the rule against harm to others, reducing the 
scope of judicial discretion.186 And with regard to free exercise, 
courts in practice regularly find ways to accommodate religious 
beliefs despite the main Smith rule.187 Even the Supreme Court 
itself exempted a religious actor under the Free Exercise Clause 
after Smith.188  
Consequently, I would allow a role for judicial judgment 
not only in nonestablishment cases, but also in free exercise 
doctrine.189 I suspect that Brownstein would actually agree that 
the Smith Court’s concern was overstated, and that free exercise 
law must allow for some balancing. Therefore I would expect him 
to be tolerant of such approaches in the Establishment Clause 
context as well. 
 D. Freedom of Association 
Recall that I am tracing the objection that it is impossible 
both to deny that religion is special and to vigorously enforce the 
religion provisions of the First Amendment. Section C considered 
this argument with respect to the third-party harm principle. 
Another important application concerns freedom of association.  
In the book, I propose a framework for protecting the 
ability of people to join together in groups—even when that 
means excluding others in ways that otherwise would violate 
civil rights laws. For example, a Roman Catholic congregation 
may exclude women when it is hiring a parish priest, even 
though discrimination on the basis of sex or gender is prohibited 
by employment law. In this instance and others, constitutional 
 
applying Congress’s standard to particular cases. Id. But judges applying the standard 
here could argue similarly that the balance has been struck by the Establishment Clause, 
as interpreted in precedent.  
186 See id. at 225-28 (giving examples where courts held that a religious 
accommodation would not impose an undue hardship, and therefore it was required by 
Title VII, even though others would be harmed).  
187 Tebbe, Smith in Theory and Practice, supra note 141, at 2056–67. 
188 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012). 
189 Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, supra note 141, at 705. Patten 
has recently embraced some balancing of private and public interests in the religious 
freedom context, though he emphasizes mechanisms to limit its role. Patten, Normative 
Logic, supra note 91, at 146–47. 
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law guarantees a right to form inegalitarian associations—
groups that reject constitutional values themselves. 
My approach clarifies law on the freedom of association by 
identifying its substantive objectives, which then are allowed to 
guide the doctrine. Because those objectives are plural, and 
because they differ with different sorts of groups, I argue that it 
is necessary to disaggregate at least three types of associations 
along with the rationales for protecting each.  
First, intimate associations are basic to personhood and 
enjoy near-absolute protection in their formation. Think here of 
the family—people can select and exclude family members for 
virtually any reason. Second are close associations, which are 
community groups that are relatively small and selective. These 
groups serve an important function in a democracy; they 
influence the formation of individuals’ interests and ideologies.190 
And, of course, such diversity among citizens is a necessary 
condition for the robust debate that is essential to a self-
governing polity. Close associations require latitude to select 
members in discriminatory ways because otherwise they might 
not be able to formulate dissenting wills and worldviews.191 
Finally, values organizations are rationalized and 
bureaucratized associations that manifest particular sets of 
commitments.192 These groups are protected for a distinct reason, 
namely their role in communicating diverse perspectives on 
critical questions of the day. Yet in order to fulfill that function, 
they require only limited freedom to exclude—they only need to 
be able to reject policy leaders for reasons that are related to 
their mission. By definition, that mission is rationalized and 
embodied in institutional structures. So it is discoverable, as I 
noted above. And it can be construed and communicated by the 
organization’s leaders without broad exemptions from civil rights 
laws. 
A deliberate and distinctive feature of this scheme is that 
it does not categorically distinguish between religious and 
 
190 I borrow the term close associations from Sager, supra note 124.  
191 For more on the importance of close associations for the formation of ideas and 
impulses, see Sager, supra note 124; Shiffrin, supra note 124. 
192 See MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 220–26 (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich, eds. 1978) (describing the bureaucratized form of social authority). 
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nonreligious associations. Instead, it identifies the constitutional 
values behind each type of associational freedom, and it shows 
how those values suggest protection for both religious and 
nonreligious groups. None of the categories matter in any 
formalistic way—they simply help differentiate the various 
purposes served by the law of associational freedom. And because 
those values can combine in particular cases, these types can be 
blended in practice. 
If religious and nonreligious associations are treated 
similarly, someone might ask, doesn’t that raise the worry that 
either some congregations will go unprotected, or close 
associations will have too much latitude to ignore civil rights 
protections?193 If all local congregations qualify as close 
associations, as it seems they must, won’t the category will sweep 
in so many nonreligious organizations that it will allow 
widespread discrimination against members of protected groups? 
According to this worry, exemptions from civil rights laws can be 
kept within reasonable bounds only by cabining the category of 
close associations to religious congregations.194 There is no other 
administrable mechanism for striking a balance between 
associational freedom and equal citizenship. Religion must be 
special here, or else civil rights will be unduly compromised. 
These fears are exaggerated. Before I explain why, it’s 
helpful to recall my affirmative case. Maintaining the status quo 
results in another sort of unfairness, namely inequity between 
religious and nonreligious associations. What justification could 
there be for categorically withholding from nonreligious groups 
the freedom to associate (and disassociate), when that liberty is 
enjoyed by religious ones? Think of religious and nonreligious 
local fraternal organizations, for instance. Both are organized 
around community service and charity work, let us assume, and 
both otherwise qualify as close associations, let us assume 
further.195 Would we really let one but not the other select 
members on discriminatory grounds?  
 
193 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 42. 
194 Id. 
195 The criterion I offer for identifying close associations includes size, bureaucracy, 
selectivity, exclusivity, commercialism, and orientation toward the expression or 
implementation of ideas or values. TEBBE, supra note __, at 84. These criteria are drawn 
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To overcome that unfairness, one needs a strong reason. 
Yet the one offered by this criticism is merely pragmatic: that 
protecting religious and nonreligious associations alike would 
simply result in too much discrimination. We need to draw a line, 
and the line around the category of religion is socially available 
and judicially administrable.196 
My answer is twofold but straightforward. First, relatively 
few groups will qualify as close associations. And qualifying as a 
close association only triggers a presumption, which the 
government can overcome by showing its policies are necessary 
for the pursuit of a compelling interest.197  
Let’s unpack my two responses. Close associations are 
distinguished by the state’s recognition that any democracy must 
preserve a social space for the independent formation of interests 
and ideologies. That is even true, or maybe especially true, where 
the ideas are illiberal or exclusionary. Since bonds of trust and 
identification are important to will formation, they are protected 
from government intrusion—but they characterize only a few 
organizations outside the family.  
Rather than simply directing constitutional actors to 
protect close associations, defined as groups knit together tightly 
enough to incubate independent ideas, the law of association 
provides several identifying characteristics that can be 
administered by constitutional actors. So courts inquire into the 
group’s size, bureaucracy, selectivity, exclusivity, commercialism, 
and orientation to ideas.198 These factors are taken from the 
“private club” exception to public accommodation laws, but they 
 
from doctrine on whether a group qualifies as a private club, such that it will be exempt 
from public accommodations laws. See Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State 
Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 646 (2016). Sepper highlights 
how courts have established what qualifies as a private club. See Wright v. Cork Club, 
315 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301–02 (1969); 
Nesmith v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Raleigh, 397 F.2d 96, 101–02 (4th Cir. 1968).  
196 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 50 (“American society intuitively recognizes that 
religious groups, notwithstanding all of the good that they do for their own members and 
the community at large, are intrinsically exclusionary. That intuition, I suggest, is not so 
commonly accepted for other kinds of associations in our society. The fact that the 
exclusionary nature of religious associations is recognized to be distinctive and deserving 
of greater protection from the mandates of civil rights laws than secular associations may 
be a valuable working arrangement that maximizes both religious liberty and anti-
discrimination principles.”). 
197 TEBBE, supra note 11, at 84–85. 
198 See id. at 84 (citing Sepper, supra note 195, at 646). 
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also help to orient the constitutional exemption.199 They have 
often been applied by courts, providing a rich set of precedents to 
guide judges. And although they are readily administrable, they 
should be interpreted and enforced with an eye to the animating 
purposes of associational law. When that is done properly, few 
groups will qualify as close associations. 
Once a group is recognized as a close association, it enjoys 
a presumption of protection in its decisions over inclusion and 
exclusion. However, that presumption can be overcome if the 
government can show that enforcement against the group is 
necessary to vindicate a policy of the highest order. Here, my 
proposal tracks the Court’s actual jurisprudence.200 In the 
context of civil rights laws, the government often will have 
compelling reasons for enforcing antidiscrimination measures, 
namely ensuring equal economic opportunity, guarding against 
unequal standing in the social and political communities, and 
communicating disapproval of bias.201 Those ends, taken 
seriously, give the government an overriding reason not just to 
enact civil rights laws in the first place, but also to deny an 
exemption to an individual practitioner. Accommodating even a 
 
199 See Sepper, supra note 195, at 649–50 (“The Supreme Court’s analysis of 
constitutional freedom of association tracks this statutory distinction between private 
club and public accommodation.”).  
200 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 615–16, 623 (1984) (“The right to 
associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Infringements on that right 
may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to 
the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less 
restrictive of associational freedoms.”); see also Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 
640, 648 (2000) (reiterating the compelling interest test for freedom of association and 
quoting the language above from Jaycees). 
201 This is why I think Brownstein is incorrect to say that “[b]asically, [Tebbe] urges 
us to expand the scope of exemptions from anti-discrimination laws for secular 
associations – particularly for close associations.” Brownstein, supra note 12, at 43.  
     On the three purposes of antidiscrimination law, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 9–12 (1996) (describing the accepted 
purposes of antidiscrimination law); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious 
Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 
627–628 (2015) (same). 
    On antidiscrimination as a compelling interest, compare the majority opinion in 
Hobby Lobby: “The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, 
for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal 
sanction. Our decision today provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling 
interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard 
to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that 
critical goal.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014). 
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single instance of discrimination on the basis of a protected 
characteristic—think of race or sex—can normalize bias and 
undermine the communicative impact of equality law.  
Applying this framework to both religious and 
nonreligious associations may be seen to create the dilemma 
identified earlier. Either too few religious organizations will be 
protected from civil rights laws, or too many nonreligious 
associations will be exempt, allowing excessive discrimination. 
Granting religious congregations special accommodations from 
civil rights laws seems to avoid this dilemma, because 
nonreligious groups will be held more strictly to equality laws 
and thereby the total amount of social discrimination will be 
confined to tolerable levels.202 
Yet, again, this way of thinking risks unfairness between 
religious and nonreligious organizations.203 That is the reason for 
applying the same rules to both of them, after all: none of the 
justifications for allowing associations to practice exclusion are 
specific to religious congregations or denominations. Especially 
with regard to the values that drive freedom for close 
associations in a democracy—commitments to the importance of 
independent discovery and to the free development of wills and 
worldviews—nonreligious groups are similarly situated.204 I 
doubt whether faith associations have unique combinations of 
characteristics,205 but even if that were true it would not provide 
a reason to treat them differently in principle. 
 
202 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 50. 
203 See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text. 
204 Sepper points out that public accommodations law has looked to factors indicating 
closeness or privacy to decide which groups get protected—it has not drawn a line 
between secular and religious groups. “In what has been a stable public-private divide, 
the state regulates commercial and quasi-commercial entities in the interest of equality, 
while giving private associations license to discriminate in the interest of their in-turning 
nature. Statutory law and constitutional doctrine has not drawn a distinction between 
religious and secular, but rather has relied on multi-factor analysis (including profit 
status, commercial nature, selectivity, exclusivity, and intimacy of an entity) to police the 
public-private line.” Sepper, supra note 195, at 637. 
205 Compare Brownstein’s view: “Religious congregations connect with family life 
more than any other kind of association in our society. Religion relates to marriage, 
procreation, child rearing, life cycle changes, and the death of family members. For 
devoutly religious people, religion is an intrinsic part of their family association. Religious 
congregations are obviously involved in value formation and the transmission of values 
within the religious community. Religious associations are also a voice in the market 
place of ideas. While national or regional religious associations may be speakers and idea 
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Can secular and sacred groups be analyzed together 
under the framework I have proposed, without under-protecting 
the former or overprotecting the latter?206 I think so. Virtually all 
local congregations will qualify as close associations, so that they 
can exclude non-adherents without legal reprisal. It is highly 
doubtful that a municipality or state could identify reasons 
strong enough to overcome that kind of membership boundary. 
Perhaps the outcome would be different for a megachurch whose 
character is entirely different, so that insulation from 
antidiscrimination law would no longer serve the objectives of 
associational freedom. Or perhaps a group like scientology would 
be deemed too commercial to qualify (without questioning 
whether it is a religion). Yet other examples are difficult to 
imagine. 
For nonreligious associations, courts and other 
constitutional actors would have to decide first whether the 
assembly counted as a close association, and then—assuming it 
did—whether the government’s regulation of membership choices 
satisfied strict scrutiny. Some would fail the first test. In Jaycees, 
the Court arguably suggested that the Jaycees could not be 
considered an expressive association in the first place.207 
Similarly, county bar associations are designed to promote 
networking among legal professionals, among other goals, and 
they therefore are too commercialized to merit insulation from 
civil rights laws.208 In other words, these groups are not 
 
communicators at the state or national level, religious congregations have a voice at the 
local level. I doubt any secular association can demonstrate the depth and breadth of 
religious associations across these categorical lines.” Brownstein, supra note 12, at 39. 
206 Brownstein says that it is difficult to do both, and therefore my theory occupies a 
position “between a rock and a hard place.” Id. at 43. 
207 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984) (“There is…no basis in the 
record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the 
organization’s ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred 
views.”). The opinion was ambiguous as to whether the Jaycees failed the threshold test 
or whether the public accommodations law was sufficiently tailored to the compelling 
interest in combatting gender discrimination. 
208 Ethnically-specific bar associations, like those described by Brownstein, may 
promote professional advancement among a particular group without the ability to 
exclude members in discriminatory ways. And the Christian Legal Society, which 
Brownstein also mentions, seems quite distinct from a bar association. Brownstein, supra 
note 12, at 46–47. 
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primarily organized to form wills and promote worldviews, but 
instead they exist to promote professional advancement.209  
Other groups may easily qualify as close associations but 
still be denied protection because their interest in membership 
exclusion is overbalanced by the state’s antidiscrimination 
imperative.210 Think here of the Little League or AYSO, the 
children’s soccer organization.211 Even assuming these groups 
exist in part to foster certain values in children, and even if they 
feature the bonds of trust and identification necessary for 
effective exploration of basic commitments, lawmakers may well 
be able to require them to be open to everyone on 
nondiscriminatory terms. The threefold goals of 
nondiscrimination law—economic opportunity, equal citizenship, 
and disapproval of inequality—may justify ensuring that 
children and their families have equal access to such basic 
institutions of civil society.212  
In between, there will be borderline groups that may or 
may not receive First Amendment protection for associational 
decisions, depending either on the threshold determination or on 
the subsequent test. Again, the Jaycees themselves presented a 
difficult case. Or think of sports clubs, intellectual organizations, 
and music groups.213 Courts will have to make contextualized 
determinations in these situations, but they will engage in those 
inquiries with the help of developed case law. Unfairness will 
certainly be a risk—but perhaps that danger should be preferred 
 
209 Parent teacher associations should be analyzed similarly because although public 
schools are involved in will formation, they are engaged in that endeavor on behalf of the 
state and for public-regarding reasons. Cf. Brownstein, supra note 12 at 48–49. Parent 
teacher associations, like public schools themselves, should be open on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. Id. at 48. 
210 Flanders wonders why these groups should enjoy a presumption of protection, 
even if the government’s interests defeat that presumption. Flanders, supra note 12, at 6. 
My answer is that they serve democratic interests in independent will formation. This 
entitles them to the presumption, but it does not necessarily entitle them to protection. 
211 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 46 (offering these examples). 
212 As Brownstein says, there is a danger that “[m]inorities may be systematically 
shut out of the public life of the community by being denied membership in all of the 
private associations in which social, political, and economic bonds are developed.” 
Brownstein, supra note 12, at 45.  
213 Flanders mentions private golf and tennis clubs in particular. Flanders, supra 
note 12, at 6. I think these might present hard cases, but courts will be able to use the 
framework I am suggesting—and that is embedded in current law, understood in its best 
light—to resolve them. 
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to the inevitable unfairness that would result if religious groups 
were systematically preferred over nonreligious ones in the 
constitutional law of freedom of association. 
IV. On Symmetry  
One argument that has become prominent in public 
debate is that considerations of equal membership ought to be 
symmetrical. Risk of subordination affects not only LGBT people 
and women seeking reproductive freedom, but also adherents of 
traditional religions, on this account. Traditional believers are 
dissenters from a new liberal orthodoxy. Their views are just as 
passionately held and just as vulnerable to disparagement, 
according to the argument from symmetry.214  
In his review, Brownstein offers a sophisticated version of 
the symmetry point. He argues that religious traditionalists face 
a risk of political humiliation, which can result not just from 
outright discrimination but also from government refusal to 
exempt them from general laws. He writes, “religious individuals 
denied exemptions often feel disrespected and subordinated.”215 
In a legal system that often carves out exceptions to its laws, 
religious people who are denied an accommodation may well feel 
that their “identities and core beliefs are ignored and treated as 
if they are valueless and unworthy of recognition.”216 
 
214 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Redefining Marriage Would Erode Religious Liberty and 
Free Speech Rights of Citizens and Churches, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (April 29, 2015), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/04/14908/ (“Respect for the principle of equal 
citizenship and equal participation in the democratic process is the only way that the 
contemporary controversy over same-sex marriage can be resolved without inflicting 
harm on millions of religious believers and their institutions.”); Douglas Laycock, 
Religious Liberty for Politically Active Minority Groups: A Response to NeJaime and 
Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. F. 369, 376, 378 (2016) (“I agree that there is a dignitary harm in 
being refused service because of perceived immorality . . . [but] NeJaime and Siegel never 
acknowledge the dignitary harm on the religious side. Those seeking exemption believe 
that they are being asked to defy God’s will [among other serious infringements of 
religious convictions]…. These are among the harms religious liberty is intended to 
prevent, and an expressive harm on the other side cannot justify inflicting such 
harms….Viewed in purely secular terms, we have intangible emotional harms on both 
sides of the balance. The emotional harm to potential customers or patients cannot 
compellingly outweigh the emotional harm to believers.”). 
215 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 34. 
216 Id. at 34. Beyond such academic writers, moreover, the argument from symmetry 
carries considerable political currency at the moment. See, e.g., Elder Lance R. Wickman, 
Promoting Religious Freedom in a Secular Age: Fundamental Principles, Practical 
Priorities, and Fairness for All, NEWSROOM (2016), 
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Such arguments can be highly complex, and they require 
careful analysis. Here, I will limit myself to equal protection and 
nonestablishment doctrines, both of which ask whether the 
government has denigrated a particular group defined by 
attributes such as religion or sexual identity, so that outsiders 
are rendered disfavored in the political community.217 From the 
perspective of that law, the question ought to be whether the 
government is constituting outsiders as legally subordinate. That 
inquiry is objective, not subjective (it asks about the purpose of 
the law, not the motivation of lawmakers) and it is legal, not 
psychological (the question is whether the government has 
changed the legal relationship between itself and particular 
classes of citizens).218 
Government discrimination against a protected class does 
subordinate in this way. For example, states that criminalized 
acts of sodomy by people of the same sex, or enforced general 
sodomy bans only against same-sex couples, denigrated gay and 
lesbian citizens.219 And a city that effectively banned animal 
sacrifice by members of a particular sect rendered them 
disfavored as a legal matter.220 So too, a town that erected a 
crèche on its courthouse steps, without any other holiday 
symbols, officially endorsed one faith over others.221  
 
http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/promoting-religious-freedom-secular-age-
fundamental-principles-practical-priorities-fairness-for-all (“The risk is that traditional 
believers and their religious institutions may eventually be relegated to pariah status—
officially recognized as ‘equal citizens’ while in practical reality marginalized and 
penalized for their faith.”). 
217 Tebbe, supra note 143, at 651. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Creation and 
Reconstruction of the First Amendment, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: ESSAYS ON FIRST 
AMENDMENT LAW 36, 61 (Daniel N. Robinson & Richard N. Williams, eds. 2016) (“Surely 
Alabama could not adopt a state motto proclaiming itself ‘the White Supremacy State.’ 
Such a motto would offend basic principles of equal citizenship and equal protection.”). 
218 Tebbe, supra note 143, at 659 n.41, 667 & n.79; Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard 
H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 
1524, 1528, 1548 (2000); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal 
Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000). 
219 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (holding that Texas’s sodomy law 
imposed “stigma” on “homosexual persons”). 
220 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993) (“In 
sum, the neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion: The ordinances had as their object the 
suppression of religion. The pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria 
adherents and their religious practices . . . .”). 
221 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601–02 (1989). 
TEBBE%2C MACRO VERSION 31.1 (3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2018  1:19 PM 
2018 CONSCIENCE AND EQUALITY 59 
Yet the question here is somewhat different, namely 
whether refusing to accommodate religious actors relegates them 
to a diminished position in the political community. Does a civil 
rights law that prohibits private actors from excluding people 
based on protected grounds subordinate traditional conservatives 
whose religion requires such exclusion? To take a specific 
situation, does the State of Colorado compromise the equal 
standing of religious bakers when it enforces a general ban on 
LGBT discrimination, so that they are prohibited from refusing 
to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples?222 Does the 
government alter its legal relationship to them by enforcing this 
law? 
Start by distinguishing two understandings of these 
questions. First, the issue might be whether the government has 
an impermissible purpose in protecting LGBT citizens in public 
accommodations. At least initially, there seems to be no invidious 
purpose—after all, Colorado’s civil rights law applies to everyone 
in the same way. Moreover, the purposes of public 
accommodations laws—ensuring equal economic opportunity, 
preserving equal social standing, and encouraging 
nondiscrimination—are all neutral as to religion.  
Another understanding of these questions is that the state 
disfavored religious conservatives by refusing or neglecting to 
grant them an exemption from its public accommodations law. 
This is the possibility that Brownstein raises, and it too seems 
reasonable in theory.223 And in practice as well, declining to 
 
222 See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017) 
(granting cert.). 
223 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 33–34. Here I put aside the possibility, raised by 
Justice Kennedy at oral argument, that Colorado officials were subjectively motivated by 
contempt for religious traditionalists. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n (2017) (No. 16-111), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-
111_f314.pdf  (“in this case, pages 293 and 294 of – of the Petitioner appendix, the – 
Commissioner Hess says freedom of religion used to justify discrimination is a despicable 
piece of rhetoric”); id. at 52 (“Suppose we thought that in significant part at least one 
member of the Commission based the commissioner’s decision on – on – on the grounds 
that – of hostility to religion. Can – can your – could your judgment then stand?”). If the 
state was motivated by bias when it applied the civil rights law to Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
that would be an unusual circumstance that would not be present in most cases. 
Brownstein’s claim is different, namely that refusing to grant an accommodation itself 
subordinates religious traditionalists, even absent any particular discriminatory 
motivation. 
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grant a religious exemption when others are readily 
accommodated could suffice to denigrate religious adherents 
under some circumstances. Recall the Newark police department 
that refused to exempt Muslim officers from its ban on beards, 
even though it accommodated officers with medical reasons for 
needing to grow their beards.224 Arguably at least, the 
department’s selective refusal violated equal citizenship.  
Yet in the context of public accommodations laws this 
seems like an unlikely conclusion. As Elizabeth Sepper has 
demonstrated, exemptions from these state laws are rare, apart 
from the common carve-out for private clubs.225 Religious 
exemptions are exceptional, and religious exemptions for 
businesses are nonexistent.226 As a matter of social meanings, 
then, it seems doubtful that declining to exempt religious actors 
is driven by any anti-religious purpose, though again this is a 
question of history, context, structure, and social meanings.227  
My conclusion from this short analysis is that symmetry 
of subordination, though possible in principle, can be established 
in practice only by considering a specific case.228 In the course of 
 
224 Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 
(3d Cir. 1999). 
225 Sepper, supra note 195, at 637. 
226 Id. (“Public accommodations laws typically do not offer religious exemptions. 
When exemptions exist, they tend to be limited to a narrow range of activities of religious 
non-profits and to co-religionist favoritism alone.”). 
227 On the other side, while the significance of religious accommodations from civil 
rights laws can be concern for religious freedom, it can also represent state endorsement 
of discrimination. Cf. Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars in Transnational 
Perspective: Religious Liberty, Third-Party Harm, and Pluralism, in THE CONSCIENCE 
WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 13 
(Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., forthcoming 2018) (“In the culture-war 
context in which complicity claims are arising, the social meaning of conscience objections 
is readily intelligible to those whose conduct is condemned. . . . But even when not 
explicitly communicated, the status-based judgment entailed in the refusal is clear to the 
recipient.”).  
228 I made a similar point in the book: 
This symmetry [between the subordination of sexual minorities and 
religious traditionalists] is more apparent than actual; in fact, 
religious traditionalists and members of protected classes are not 
positioned in exactly the same way with respect to the principle of 
equal citizenship. When civil rights laws prohibit discrimination, they 
do not single out religious traditionalists for special disfavor but 
instead express disapproval of all discriminatory practices, whether 
religious or secular. In other words, the purpose and social meaning of 
equality law does not target religious people, or even religious 
traditionalists, and it does not alter their citizenship standing on that 
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that analysis, it will be necessary to distinguish between losing 
political battles and becoming subordinate in a legal relationship 
with the government. To be sure, religious groups have suffered 
both in the past. And it is quite possible for members of religious 
majorities to face official denigration. So although the argument 
from symmetry cannot be dismissed out of hand, it cannot be 
accepted in a facile way, independent of context. 
V. Coherence and Compromise—Method Revisited  
Some of the contributions to this symposium have 
engaged the social coherence method itself. Because they include 
some misimpressions about the method, but also because they 
raise fascinating issues, they are worth addressing. But before 
doing so, let me briefly review and reframe the argument. 
Social coherence is designed to answer skeptics who 
believe that it is impossible to give reasons for outcomes in the 
field of religious freedom—that conclusions of law cannot be 
justified there. I argue that coherent conclusions are justified 
because they are backed by reasons. Resolutions of new cases can 
be supported through analogy to precedents or through 
application of principles that account for those cases.229 No 
precedent and no principle is invulnerable to reexamination and 
revision, when using this method. In fact, spurring critique of 
settled conclusions is close to the central point of social 
 
basis. Instead, it combats discriminatory practices on the part of 
private actors, whether religious or secular, that work to disadvantage 
protected classes in the economy, in society, and in politics. Many feel 
the denial of an exemption acutely and sincerely. But that does not 
change the social meaning of the law, however contingent it may be. 
TEBBE, supra note 11, at 118. 
229 Laura Underkuffler understands this objective particularly well. She writes, 
When we think of conflicts between religion and secular norms of 
equality, we tend – in Tebbe’s words – to assume an area of law that is 
“inherently or necessarily patternless.” We tend to think of these 
conflicts as boiling down to a personal view as to which is more 
intrinsically important – religion or equality. . . . [But Tebbe] rejects 
the arguments of academic skeptics and others that these conflicts are 
by nature something that is not amenable to the judicial task. Rather, 
he argues, conflicts between religious freedom and civil rights can be 
worked through by courts, using what he calls a “social coherence” 
approach.  
Underkuffler, supra note 12, at 3–4. I would only add that I defend such reasoning not 
only in courts, but wherever constitutional interpretation happens. 
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coherence.230 Even so, its outcomes count as law because they 
rest on interpretive arguments that carry legal authority, such as 
those from text, structure, precedent, and history.231  
Sometimes the method is misunderstood as an effort to 
overcome or transcend partisan conflict, perhaps by “generating” 
discrete answers without reliance on controversial commitments. 
This misimpression draws the critique that actually social 
coherence will only reproduce partisan conflicts on another level, 
where each position is backed by reasons instead of merely 
asserted. And those disagreements will be no less emotional and 
no less intractable.  
But agreement is not goal of the method. As Underkuffler 
explains in her perceptive review, “[a]lthough [Tebbe] suggests 
that the antagonists themselves might find he method he 
suggests to be enlightening, convincing them to abandon 
preconceived notions and to come to an amicable compromise is 
not the primary focus of the book.”232 Yet other commentators 
sometimes do seem to suggest that agreement is promised, and 
they are disappointed when it is not delivered. 
Chad Flanders, for instance, notices that that there can be 
more than one coherent solution to a problem. And, he says, “the 
fact that there are many solutions and many rational solutions 
may just repackage the skeptic’s worry at another level.”233 
Later, he adds that  
[S]ocial coherence may just change the way we look 
at disagreements, but it may not make those 
 
230 A helpful comparison is to Dworkin’s interpretivism, insofar as social coherence 
also acknowledges the role of moral reasoning in legal interpretation. RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE 47, 52, 65–68, 96–98 (1986).  
    Because the method is designed to spur critique of accepted authorities, both 
moral and legal, I do not believe it has a conservative bias and I resist the idea that 
historical resolutions of conflicts between religious freedom and equality law have a 
“determinative” role in the method, as Carlos Ball suggests at one point in his thoughtful 
response. Ball, supra note 12, at 3. Nearly everything else Ball says in his review seems 
correct to me. 
231 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991) (describing 
authoritative “modalities” of legal interpretation); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 
(1987); Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 19 
(1990). 
232 Underkuffler, supra note 12, at 12. 
233 Flanders, supra note 12, at 3. 
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disagreements any less fierce, any less intractable. 
We can agree that both sides have reasons, but we 
may disagree about what the best reasons are, and 
how to weigh those reasons. We may have gotten 
precisely nowhere, substantively, toward an 
agreement. We have just changed the terms of that 
disagreement.234 
This account is not exactly wrong, but it is based on a 
misimpression. The point of a coherence method is not to lower 
the temperature of debates. Actually, its effect may be to sharpen 
citizens’ claims of injustice by lending them force or authority, at 
least in the near term.  
Rather, my methodological objective is just to defend 
against the charge that interpretations and outcomes can only be 
arbitrary or patternless. That charge is dangerous not only 
because it could fuel an argument that judges should avoid 
religious freedom disputes—or, worse, that constitutional 
argument cannot be deployed by any policymakers235—but also 
because undermines a crucial component of fair decisionmaking 
in a democracy. Officials must be able to give reasons for their 
actions, so that citizens can examine and evaluate those 
justifications.236 Social coherence does nothing to avoid 
disagreement, and in fact it explicitly envisions reasonable 
 
234 Id. at 5. 
235 For an argument that judges should avoid religious freedom disputes because of 
concerns about arbitrariness, see SMITH, supra note 136, at 6, 68; see also POSNER, supra 
note 56, at x. For a suggestion that constitutional arguments on such questions might not 
be appropriate even outside courts, see SMITH, supra note 136, at 79. 
236 Jeremy Kessler and David Pozen argue that prescriptive legal theories have a 
tendency to “cannibalize themselves.” Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working 
Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Thoery of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1819 
(2016). Such theories begin by promising to offer principles that can transcend partisan 
legal conflict. But over time, as they encounter and assimilate critiques, they become 
compromised, so that they no longer can rise above the fray. Ultimately, they end up 
reproducing first-order political conflicts. Id. at 1823. The social coherence method may 
not be subject to this critique, in one sense. That is because it does not seek to transcend 
disagreement in the first place—it is, as Kessler and Pozen put it, “impure by design” and 
therefore not subject to the dynamic they identify. Id. at 1831. But other aspects of my 
project may well work themselves impure. For instance, principles such as the rule 
against harm to others do seek to resolve disputes outside of pure political contestation 
and they therefore may well be subject to the kind of dialectic that Kessler and Pozen 
describe. Whether that happens will depend on the reasons people can offer against their 
attractiveness and authoritativeness, and whether any responses dilute the principles 
beyond recognition or usefulness. So far, that has not happened but it remains possible. 
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disagreement as a fixed feature of democratic debate.237 Over 
time, citizens can try to change each others’ minds, not just 
through intellectual debate but also through the mechanisms of 
social and political mobilizations. 
When I suggest at the end of the book that preserving a 
role for reasons permits a more lasting form of national unity, I 
am not promising that the coherence method will ease quotidian 
battles, as Flanders suggests.238 Again, it may have the opposite 
effect. Instead, I am pointing toward the conviction that citizens 
should be given reasons for government coercion, reasons that 
they can access if not accept.239 That makes it possible for them 
to resist using arguments that stand a chance of someday 
prevailing.  
By contrast, if citizens are subject to government coercion 
without justification, they may feel differently aggrieved and 
perhaps alienated. That is why I question part of Flanders’ call 
for compromise. Of course, compromise carries significant 
appeal—it gives something to both sides, as Flanders says, and it 
avoids the hurt feelings that can accompany an unmitigated loss. 
A modus vivendi solution can also defer a hard legal question in 
the hope that it will be resolved outside law, through social and 
political dynamics.240  
But I think it is necessary to distinguish between two 
possible versions of the argument. First, Flanders may be saying 
just that competing commitments should be considered and 
accommodated where possible. That is absolutely correct—in 
fact, I seek and find solutions like that throughout the book. For 
instance, county clerks with religious objections to same-sex 
marriage might well be accommodated in ways that have no 
 
237 See Micah Schwartzman, The Completeness of Public Reason, 3 POL., PHIL., AND 
ECON. 191, 193, 194–197 (2004) (distinguishing between the indeterminacy of individual 
reason, which is avoidable, and the inconclusiveness of public outcomes, which is an 
enduring feature of any healthy democracy). 
238 Flanders, supra note 12, at 5. 
239 Of course, there is an enormous literature on this subject, which I could review 
neither in the book’s short conclusion nor in this Reply.  
240 Flanders, supra note 12, at 6 (“there are virtues to compromise, and I want to 
rehearse them now and, to a great extent, endorse them”); id at 7. (“[o]f course, the 
problem with compromises is obvious: compromises will always be open to the objection 
that they are not principled”). 
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impact, material or expressive, on unorthodox couples.241 That 
solution does not give someone like Kim Davis everything that 
she wants—recall that she initially tried to prevent everyone in 
her office from processing marriage licenses—but it gives her 
meaningful protection without harm to others. 
But the call for compromise might entail something 
different, namely seeking unreasoned solutions as a policy 
preference. At times, Flanders seems to embrace this second 
version. He says that he wants to avoid situations in which the 
losers are told that “their reasons [are] not looked at as 
persuasive reasons or reasons at all,”242 or where they are told 
that their positions “are somehow incoherent.”243 Quite clearly, 
the benefit here is that those on the losing end of a government 
decision do not have to face the full emotional impact of their 
loss.244 Compromise also “buys us time,” during which facts on 
the ground may evolve, lessening the tension between religious 
freedom and equality law.245 Again, those are both real benefits. 
But government failure to give reasons for its decisions—
or its affirmative effort to avoid giving reasons—risks a form of 
injustice. Telling religious traditionalists that they are not 
getting what they want, or not getting all of what they want, 
without giving reasons entails the dangers of arbitrary power. 
Striking these kinds of compromises when reasoned solutions are 
unavailable is one thing. But actively preferring unreasoned 
solutions seems to be quite another. 
Rather than lowering the temperature of contemporary 
conflicts, compromise of this second form may well raise pressure 
on both sides. Justifications for government action can be 
understood, resisted, and possibly changed, but unjustified 
outcomes elicit pure contestation. Some of that is unavoidable 
anyway. But to privilege raw power contests when reasoned 
 
241 TEBBE, supra note 11, at 180–81. 
242 Flanders, supra note 12, at 3. 
243 Id. at 9 (original emphasis).  
244 Id. at 7 (“No one gets exactly what they want, and so neither side is fully happy. 
At the same time, neither side is fully unhappy. That is the benefit of compromise.”). 
245 Id. 7–8. Here Flanders, like me, is open to Koppelman’s objection that his 
“expectation [that groups will evolve toward egalitarianism] is likely to be disappointed, 
at least with respect to some groups. The Catholics, Mormons, Orthodox Jews, and 
Southern Baptists will not come around any time soon. Tolerance had best not depend on 
any prediction that they will.” Koppelman, supra note 12, at 4–5. 
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solutions are available may entail costs that overbalance the 
benefits. Maybe I am misunderstanding Flanders here, but on 
my reading this risk remains a worry. 
Patricia Marino’s response paper, though fascinating and 
erudite, seems to operate with a similar misimpression about the 
strength and scope of the argument for social coherence. She 
describes the approach as “meant to point us toward consensus,” 
and she says that “[t]he idea, I take it, is that in the context of 
legal reasoning we can find and appeal to a shared initial 
perspective to generate conclusions that we all must recognize as 
justified.”246 But the point of social coherence is not to generate 
consensus, either about whether an outcome is justified, in the 
sense of being supported with reasons, or about whether it is 
actually correct, in the sense that those reasons are persuasive or 
right. Rather, the point of the method is more modest—again, it 
is simply to preserve the possibility of reasoned argument over 
religious freedom outcomes. 
A coherence method preserves the possibility of two kinds 
of conflict. First, actors may disagree about whether an 
advocated solution is coherent, in the sense that it fits together 
with precedents and principles that the debaters agree are 
authoritative. This is a disagreement about justification. Second, 
they may disagree about whether the outcome is correct—they 
may differ about whether a solution, though supportable by 
analogies to precedents and applications of principles, 
nevertheless is supported in convincing ways.  
So it seems not quite right to say that the coherence 
method, as I defend it, is meant to “generate” outcomes that 
everyone must recognize as either coherent or correct. Rather, 
the method preserves the possibility of disagreement itself. It 
shows how people can argue both about justification, or 
coherence, and about persuasiveness, or correctness. And 
although disagreement is integral to any democracy, that does 
not mean that arbitrariness is inevitable, as the skeptics would 
have it.  
Can a morally abhorrent position nevertheless be 
coherent? This is a question that extends beyond the scope of the 
 
246 Marino, supra note 12, at 5. 
TEBBE%2C MACRO VERSION 31.1 (3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2018  1:19 PM 
2018 CONSCIENCE AND EQUALITY 67 
book, but it is interesting to consider. Marino has a position: she 
says that it is possible for immoral positions to be coherent, and 
that the way to argue against them is on “moral grounds,” rather 
than through charges of incoherence.247 That is, one should argue 
that such positions are substantively wrong, rather than 
unjustified. But what would be the basis for such a moral 
argument, for Marino? This calls to mind Joseph Raz’s worry 
that coherence approaches have nothing to say when coherent 
accounts conflict—that there is no “base” from which coherence 
theorists can criticize such positions.248 
Whether or not this is true as a matter of general 
morality, it need not be true of legal interpretation.249 After all, 
lawyers and judges operate against the background of some 
shared authorities, including, for instance, the text of the 
Constitution, certain generally-accepted statutes, and basic 
common-law principles. Legal conventions exist as a matter of 
specialized social meaning, in other words, and they both ground 
and constrain interpretive argument in this professional domain. 
I take this to be relatively uncontroversial, except among some 
skeptics. 
Even if I am right, however, it means only that it is 
possible for lawyers to argue that their opponents’ positions are 
incoherent, as well as incorrect. For example, in the book I 
contend that the Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. was incoherent insofar as it failed to account for the 
rule against third-party harms.250 I would be wrong if Justice 
Alito, the author of the Court’s opinion, could establish that the 
principle simply did not exist. Then he could maintain that the 
Court’s opinion was coherent, as he did, and I would have little to 
say in response.251 However, because the precedents I leverage 
are authoritative among lawyers, I can maintain that the Court’s 
decision is not only wrong, but unjustified.  
 
247 Id.  
248 Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 284 (1992). 
249 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 43 (arguing that the social form of coherence theory, 
as applied to law, addresses Raz’s concern about a lack of “base”). 
250 Id. at 67–70. 
251 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014).  
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Marino raises two interesting concerns about this 
approach. First, she worries that it constrains legal change, 
because recognized legal authorities become fixed.252 Second, she 
says the approach may discount marginal social voices simply 
because they resist majoritarian understandings.253  
Neither of these ought to trouble us, however. Because 
people can disagree about coherence itself, as well as about 
correctness, change is explicitly contemplated by the method. 
After all, few legal authorities are permanent, as Marino herself 
observes in her fascinating discussion of LGBT rights.254 Here, it 
is important to appreciate that legal interpretations interact with 
broader social and political understandings of religious freedom 
and the Constitution. Over time, social movements and political 
initiatives can work real change to accepted legal authorities. 
Nor is it correct to say that the method skews against 
minority legal positions. On the contrary, I would say that 
prompting the examination and reexamination of conventional 
doctrine is close to the heart of the method. Not only dominant 
players, but marginalized critics can make arguments that must 
be taken seriously because they deploy authorities that have 
recognized force, even if only as a matter of contingent social and 
legal meanings.255 And marginal voices can make claims not only 
that accepted understandings are incorrect because based on 
faulty reasoning, but also that they are incoherent or unjustified 
because they fail to take into account certain precedents or 
principles. While reasoning in this way may not successfully 
escape powerful influences, it is not inherently biased in their 
favor.256 
Marino asks, what does it mean for understandings to be 
“shared” in the sense I use that term? This is a complex matter. 
 
252 Marino, supra note 12, at 6. 
253 Id. at 8–9. 
254 Id. at 6–9. 
255 You could think of my own defense of the principle of avoiding harm to others in 
that way. 
256 I suppose Marino is right to be concerned that the approach allows privileged legal 
actors to describe unprivileged positions as “incoherent.” Id. at 9. But at least it also 
empowers the latter to find places where the dominant approach is unjustified or 
irrational. By contrast, the skeptics’ approach would leave minority or marginalized 
voices to the vagaries of pure power politics.  
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Here, I will say only that legal understandings, like social 
meanings generally, do have a core and a periphery. As Jack 
Balkin has put it, some legal interpretations are “on the wall” 
and others are “off the wall” at any given time.257 Think of this as 
an Overton Window for legal discourses and institutions.258 
Almost everything about this domain is contested, contingent, 
and changeable. But it nonetheless allows lawyers to make 
arguments that can be justified because backed by reasons—and 
that is all that a defense of social coherence needs to establish. 
I believe that these few misunderstandings follow from 
Marino’s initial sense that social coherence aims at a kind of 
consensus—or, even more strongly, that it seeks to “generate” 
that consensus through some sort of deterministic process. 
Without that view, her other concerns dissipate. No longer does 
the approach have any difficulty accounting for legal change, and 
no longer does it privilege nonminority positions. On the 
contrary, social coherence opens up space for additional 
contestation—it allows dissenting voices to argue that 
established legal understandings not only are incorrect, but that 
they also can be incoherent. These are powerful weapons. They 
may well not be sufficient to overcome the countervailing 
influence of incumbent interests and ideologies, but it will force 
the articulation of arguments grounded in legal authorities. 
CONCLUSION 
Thinking broadly about religion and equality law, in the 
way I have here, suggests several conclusions. First, the lessons 
of critical theorists on both the political right and left must be 
fully incorporated—including their teachings on the plasticity of 
the category of religion. Yet that does not mean that reasons 
cannot or should not be given for (at least some) conclusions of 
 
257 See generally, Jack M. Balkin, From off the Wall to on the Wall: How the Mandate 
Challenge Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/ archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-
how-the-mandate-challenge-went-main- stream/258040. 
258 See Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393–
94 (2015) (“Joseph Overton observed that in a given public policy area, such as education, 
only a relatively narrow range of potential policies will be considered politically 
acceptable.”) (citing The Overton Window: A Model of Policy Change, MACKINAC CTR. FOR 
PUB. POL’Y, www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow). 
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constitutional law that we reach in this area. It does mean that 
those justifications are likely to be dynamic and overdetermined.  
Second, the specialness of religion should be rejected in 
one specific sense: the category of religion should be 
supplemented with other recognizable categories of belief and 
practice where that is necessary to promote the values animating 
various First Amendment doctrines. While religious freedom 
ought not be supplanted, there seems to be no good reason not to 
reduce the unfairness and arbitrariness of protecting (or 
burdening) religion alone. 
Third and related, a substantive theory of religious 
freedom will appreciate the several values driving different 
aspects of the doctrine. Moreover, it will pursue them with an eye 
to guaranteeing full and equal membership in the democratic 
polity. As it turns out, it is quite possible to both reject the 
argument that religion ought to be unique in constitutional law 
and to vigorously seek to vindicate the values of the First 
Amendment. But only detailed analysis of specific doctrines can 
show that to be true. I plan to provide that analysis in my next 
major project. 
Fourth, the argument from symmetry—i.e., the warning 
that traditional religious people are also at risk of 
subordination—holds some truth, but should not be accepted 
uncritically. Whether religious traditionalists are constituted as 
second-class by government policy is a contextual question that 
can only be answered by examining the history, purpose, and 
context of official action.  
Finally, nothing about the method of social coherence 
promises consensus or even an easing of social tensions. Rather, 
its purpose is to establish that reasons can be given for religious 
freedom outcomes, even as those reasons exist alongside interests 
and ideologies. That ameliorates the injustice of unreasoned 
government rule. It also promotes the health of the democracy, 
but it does that not by avoiding vigorous debate but instead by 
allowing and even encouraging government actions that are 
justified.  
 
 
